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DISCLOSING DISCLOSURE'S DEFECTS:
ADDRESSING CORPORATE
IRRESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IMPACTS
Marcia Narine*
ABSTRACT
Although many people believe that the role of business is to
maximize shareholder value, corporate executives and board members
can no longer ignore their companies' human rights impacts on other
stakeholders. Over the past four years, the role and responsibility of
non-state actors such as multinationals has come under increased
scrutiny. In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council
unanimously endorsed the "UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights," which outline the State duty to protect human rights,
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and both the
State and corporations' duties to provide remedies to parties. The
Guiding Principles do not bind corporations, but dozens of countries,
including the United States, are now working on National Action
Plans to comply with their own duties, which include drafting
regulations and incentives for companies. In 2014, the UN Human
Rights Council passed a resolution to begin the process of developing a
binding treaty on business and human rights. Separately, in an effort
to address information asymmetries, lawmakers in the United States,
Canada, Europe, and California have passed human rights disclosure
legislation. Finally, dozens of stock exchanges have imposed either
mandatory or voluntary non-financial disclosure requirements, in
sync with the UN Principles.
Despite various forms of disclosure mandates, these efforts do
not work. The conflict lies within the flawed premise that, armed with
specific information addressing human rights, consumers and
investors will either reward "ethical" corporate behavior, or punish
firms with poor human rights records. However, evidence shows that
disclosures generally fail to change behavior because: (1) there are too
many of them; (2) stakeholders suffer from disclosure overload; and (3)
not enough consumers or investors penalize companies by boycotting
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products or divesting. In this Article, I examine corporate social
contract theory, normative business ethics, and the failure of
stakeholders to utilize disclosures to punish those firms that breach
the social contract. I propose that both stakeholders and companies
view corporate actions through an ethical lens, and offer an eight-
factor test to provide guidance using current disclosures or
stakeholder-specific inquiries. I conclude that disclosure for the sake of
transparency, without more, will not lead to meaningful change
regarding human rights impacts.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Mandated disclosure" may be the most common and
least successful regulatory technique in American
law. It aspires to help people making unfamiliar and
complex decisions while dealing with specialists by
requiring the latter (disclosers) to give the former
(disclosees) information so that disclosees choose
sensibly and disclosers do not abuse their
position .... [MIandated disclosure is a Lorelei,
luring lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory failure.'
Retail giant Wal-Mart has allegedly sold shrimp produced by
Thai slaves.2 Soccer's governing corporation, FIFA, has purportedly
turned a blind eye to the use of slave labor in the Qatar World Cup
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member of the SEC Disclosure Reform Working Group of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, and co-authored an amicus brief on the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals
legislation. I would like to thank Deans Alfred Garcia and Cecilia Dykas for the
research grant to complete this Article, and Anna Donovan, Anthony Ewing,
Cecilia Martin, Valentina Okaru-Bisant, Keith Rizzardi, Jeff Schwartz, Amy
Sepinwall, and Siegfried Wiessner for their comments. I am also grateful to the
participants at the Zicklin Center for Normative Business Ethics Workshop at the
Wharton School of Business for their insight. I would like to thank Matthew
Carcano, Astrid Lopez, Islam Dashoush, Evan Phoenix, Courtney Segota, and
Lauren Bengochea for their research assistance. I particularly appreciate the
contributions of Maria Catala and Erica Behm. All errors are my own.
1. Omi BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN You WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 3-4 (2014).
2. Aimee Picchi, Shrimp Sold at Walmart, Costco Tied to Slave Labour,
CBS NEWS (June 11, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/shrimp-sold-at-
walmart-costco-tied-to-slave-labor/; Kate Hodal, Chris Kelly, & Felicity Lawrence,
Revealed: Asian Slave Labour Producing Prawns for Supermarkets in US, UK,
THE GUARDIAN (June 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
2014/jun/10/supermarket-prawns-thailand-produced-slave-labour.
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venue.' Both are well-known and highly profitable enterprises, and
suffered reputational-but not financial-setbacks following the
disclosure of this information.4
Many believe that the role of business is to maximize
shareholder value.' This "shareholder view" holds that management
has a moral and legal obligation to serve the interests of the
shareholders, and to run the company solely for their benefit.6
Although it is popular in academia, and among some in business
circles, the shareholder-centric view no longer carries the day in an
increasingly globally interdependent world. Executives and board
members can no longer focus solely on their bottom line. Firms, and
especially transnational corporations ("TNCs"), simply cannot ignore
their obligations to consider social and human rights impacts on other
stakeholders. These stakeholders include civil society organizations,'
3. See, e.g., Ian Black, Owen Gibson, & Robert Booth, Qatar Promises to
Reform Labour Laws After Outcry Over 'World Cup Slaves', THE GUARDIAN (May
14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/14/qatar-reform-labout-
laws-outcry-world-cup-slaves; Ian Traynor, Fifa Says There Is Little It Can Do
About Labour Conditions in Qatar, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/fifa-labour-conditions-qatar-world-
cup; Kevin Maguire, Qatar Accused of Working 1,200 People to Death, MIRROR
(Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/2022-world-cup-qatar-
accused-3303458.
4. Suzanne Vranica, Tripp Mickle, & Joshua Robinson, FIFA Corruption
Scandal Pressures Soccer Governing Body's Sponsors, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/scandal-in-world-soccer-pressures-sponsors-
1432861411 (acknowledging that although FIFA sponsors expressed concern after
U.S. prosecutors released an indictment detailing broad corruption charges, none,
as of May 29, 2015, pulled out of their deals; however, "last year, Sony decided not
to renew its FIFA sponsorship, an eight-year deal valued at over $300 million,
partly because of the controversy around 2018 and 2022 World Cup events").
5. See Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17.
6. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Our Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145-63 (1932) (discussing a range of views on
the shareholder-stakeholder debate); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423-25 (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735-58 (2006); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle With the Idea That For-Profit Corporations
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135-172 (2012).
7. See Civil Society Organizations, WORLD BANK (Nov. 6, 2013),
http://go.worldbank.org/KK5KGT24XO (defining a civil society organization as
including NGOs, faith-based organizations, indigenous peoples, labor unions,
foundations, and other interested parties).
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nongovernmental 8 and intergovernmental organizations, ' socially
responsible investors ("SRIs"), 1o activists, consumers, and labor
organizations. Likewise, stakeholders should not, and cannot, ignore
their duty to hold firms accountable for these impacts. Too often,
however, corporations escape with impunity-both legally and in the
marketplace-because stakeholders fail to take action against them.
Some argue that stakeholders lack sufficient information or power to
do so. 12 I argue instead that the information stakeholders obtain
through various disclosures may be irrelevant, poorly understood,
and/or underutilized. Nonetheless, legislators use disclosure to avoid
the more politically difficult task of regulating multinational
corporations, either at home or abroad, for their human rights
abuses.
8. Non-governmental Organizations, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW,
http://unrol.org/article.aspx?article-id=23 (last visited Feb. 24, 2015) (explaining
that a nongovernmental organizations is a "not-for-profit group principally
independent from government, which [are] organized on a local, national or
international level to address issues in support of the public good . . . [which]
perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring public concerns to
governments, monitor policy and programme implementation, and encourage
participation of civil society stakeholders at the community level").
9. One such intergovernmental organization is the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD"). The OECD has thirty-four
member countries, including the United States, and works to promote policies to
improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world, including
citizens of nonmember states. About the OECD, THE ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.oecd.org/aboutt (last
visited July 30, 2015). The United Nations, with its 193 member states, is also an
intergovernmental organization. UN at a Glance, UN, http://www.un.org/en/
aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
10. Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI) Basics, U.S. SIF,
http://www.ussif.org/sribasics (last visited Feb. 24, 2015) (explaining that socially
responsible investors consider environmental, social, and governance factors
("ESG") when making investment decisions so that they can have long-term
financial and societal impact).
11. See R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern
Corporation, in ETHICAL THEORY & BUS. 38,39 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E.
Bowie eds., 2001) (discussing the types of stakeholders and how corporations
should engage with them).
12. See generally Shelley Marshall & Kate MacDonald, What
Is Corporate Accountability, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY RESEARCH,
http://corporateaccountabilityresearch.net/files/2011/09/What-is-corporate-
accountability.pdf (noting that "multi-stakeholder processes do however tend to
confront a range of practical challenges associated with both weak capacity among
key stakeholder groups to engage effectively, and in some cases, difficulties in
mediating conflicting priorities of affected stakeholders").
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Human rights are universal and inalienable. As described by
the United Nations, these rights include-among other things-the
right to adequate housing; economic, social, and cultural rights; the
right to food; educational rights; freedom of association and assembly;
and certain rights for indigenous peoples. 1 Traditionally, the
obligation to protect these rights has belonged to the State." But in
2011, the forty-seven members of the United Nations Human Rights
Council unanimously endorsed the nonbinding "UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights" ("UNGPs" or "Ruggie
Principles"), which outline: (1) the State's duty to protect human
rights; (2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and
(3) both the State and corporations' duty to provide judicial and non-
judicial remedies to aggrieved parties." The UN has clearly indicated
that the UNGPs do not impose any additional legal obligations under
international law.' 6
More significantly, lawmakers in the United States, Canada,
Europe, and the state of California have either introduced or passed
disclosure legislation designed to inform investors and consumers
about corporate human rights impacts, including, but not limited to:
the 2010 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, " Dodd-
13. See List of Human Rights Issues, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/Issues/Pages/ListOffssues.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
14. The United States and 166 other countries have ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which, among
other things, requires state parties to enact legislation, protective measures, and
remedies for the guaranteed rights to life and human dignity; freedom from
slavery; equality before the law; freedom of speech, assembly, and association;
freedom of religion; protections in criminal proceedings and the right to a fair
trial; and minority rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966).
15. See John G. Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/
A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
16. See Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Germany,
Human Rights Comm., 106th Sess., Oct. 15-Nov. 2, 2012, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6 (Nov. 12, 2012).
17. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1714.43 (West 2012).
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Frank Section 1502 (the conflict minerals rule)," a 2013 European
Commission directive requiring disclosure of certain environmental
social and governance factors by 2017, 19 the 2014 EU 20 and
Canadian 2 1 proposals related to corporate responsibility for mineral
extraction in conflict zones, and a June 2014 bill by U.S.
Congressional Representative Carolyn Maloney regarding human
trafficking in supply chains.2 2 In addition, dozens of individual stock
exchanges around the world have imposed either mandatory or
voluntary non-financial disclosure requirements.23
In June 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council
passed a resolution to begin the process of developing a binding treaty
on business and human rights, in part because no international law
governs corporate responsibility in this arena. 24 This treaty is
unlikely to pass. Therefore, disclosure rules and, by extension, the
marketplace, may be the only mechanisms to hold transnational
corporations accountable.
Although there are few international legal obligations related
to human rights for TNCs, corporations still have a role to play in
addressing human rights impacts. I argue that, like governments,
firms have entered into a "social contract" with stakeholders that
goes beyond the legal right to operate, and that allows companies to
18. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124
Stat. 1376 (West 2010).
19. European Commission, Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity
Information by Large Companies and Groups-Frequently Asked Questions (Apr.
5, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-14-301_en.htm.
20. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council: Setting up a Union system for supply chain due
diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten,
their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas (May 3,
2014), http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152227.pdf.
21. House of Commons of Canada, Bill C-486 (Can.) (Proposed Mar. 26,
2013), http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docld=6258270.
22. Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of
2014, H.R. 4842, 113th Cong. (2014), https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/house-bill/4842/text.
23. See Marcia Narine, Living in a Material World-From Naming and
Shaming to Knowing and Showing: Will New Disclosures Regimes Finally Drive
Corporate Accountability for Human Rights?, in THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS LANDSCAPE (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7).
24. Resolution on Binding Human Rights Standards Passes in
Human Rights Council, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (June 27, 2014),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/52651-treaty-alliance-press-release-on-
resolution-on-binding-human-rights-standards.html.
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co-exist and, ideally, thrive in society. More specifically, firms enter
into social contracts when they commit to certain ethical principles,
either through codes of conduct, corporate social responsibility
programs, 25 or through voluntary industry or multi-stakeholder
initiatives. At a more basic level, firms enter these "contracts"
through what UN Special Representative John Ruggie calls the
"social license to operate." 26 I will discuss this social contract, and the
25. There is no one established definition for CSR. See, e.g., Henri Servaes &
Ane Tamayo, The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm Value: The
Role of Customer Awareness, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1045, 1045-56 (2013),
http://faculty.london.edu/hservaes/ms2013.pdf (citing various definitions but
adopting the World Business Council for Sustainable Development's 2004
definition). Another appropriate definition is "a business organization's
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social
responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to
the firm's social relationships." Noam Noked, Investing in Corporate Social
Responsibility to Enhance Customer Value, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FINANCIAL REGULATION (Feb. 28, 2011, 9:31 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2011/02/28/investing-in-corporate-social-
responsibility-to-enhance-customer-value/ (citing D.J. Wood, Corporate Social
Performance Revisited, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 693 (1991)). The Danish
government, which mandates ESG reporting, defined CSR for purposes of
inclusion in reporting as "considerations for human rights, societal,
environmental and climate conditions as well as combatting corruption in ...
business strategy and corporate activities." loannis loannou & George Serafeim,
The Consequences of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Evidence
from Four Countries 7 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-100, 2014),
http://www.hbs.edulfaculty/Publication%20Files/11-100_7f383b79-8dad-462d-
90df-324e298acb49.pdf. The United States government has explained,
"[r]esponsible business conduct is intended to include a broad range of areas in
which corporate conduct impacts society. It is well understood that responsible
business conduct (RBC), sometimes referred to as corporate social responsibility
or CSR, entails conduct consistent with applicable laws and internationally
recognised standards. Based on the idea that you can do well while doing no
harm, RBC is a broad concept that focuses on two aspects of the business-society
relationship: 1) the positive contribution businesses can make to economic,
environmental, and social progress with a view to achieving sustainable
development, and 2) avoiding adverse impacts and addressing them when they do
occur." U.S. State Dep't, USG National Action Plan on Responsible Business (Feb.
12, 2015) http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/2015/usg-national-action-plan-on-
responsible-business-conduct.
26. See John G. Ruggie, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for
Business and Human Rights, 1 54, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5
(Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-
2008.pdf [hereinafter Ruggie Report]. Author and Executive Director of the
[47.1:190
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role of corporate accountability for human rights, in more detail in
Part II.
This Article examines the monitoring and enforcement of
these corporate social contracts, particularly related to human rights
impacts. I characterize a breach of the social contract as the firm's
failure to adhere to the letter or the spirit of the contractual terms to
which it voluntarily agrees. I argue that key stakeholders, such as
consumers and investors, either (1) choose not to enforce or (2) fail in
their efforts to enforce breaches of these social contracts.
Stakeholders learn about these breaches through the various
disclosures that States 27 require, or that companies disseminate
through industry or intergovernmental initiatives.
The majority of the proposals and disclosure regimes that I
discuss in this Article include either no penalties, or only minimal
procedural penalties." Disclosure theory rests on what I believe to be
the well-intentioned, but faulty, premise perpetuated by legislators
that, armed with certain information, consumers and investors will
pressure corporations to change their behavior. Many of the proposals
employ "name and shame" tactics to prey on corporate fears of
reputational damage. NGOs have used "name and shame" campaigns
against governments in the past,29 and now governments are using
them against corporations. These laws and campaigns depend on
consumers and investors to compel firms to change their business
Institute for Human Rights and Business John Morrison prefers the term "social
license," and argues that legal and political licenses are dependent upon the social
license and that it goes beyond a concept of corporate social responsibility. JOHN
MORRISON, THE SOCIAL LICENSE: HOW TO KEEP YOUR ORGANIZATION LEGITIMATE
(2014).
27. Unless otherwise specified, "States" refers to nation states.
28. Mark Dearn, Without Corporate Accountability, "Good Governance"
Falls: An Enforceable, Stakeholder Approach, THE WORLD WE WANT (Feb. 28,
2013), https://www.worldwewant20l5.org/node/314175 (acknowledging that "the
series of attempts to create frameworks to encourage responsible business
behavior include the 2012 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the
UN Global Compact, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
These exist alongside increasingly popular, voluntary 'corporate social
responsibility' programs created by individual companies. However, all of these
frameworks are beset by the same problem: they prescribe only voluntary
adherence to principles. As Human Rights Watch argues, voluntary approaches
may serve to entrench a paradigm of unenforceable commitments, ultimately to
the detriment of human rights.").
29. See Emile M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming
the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT'L ORG. 698 (2008).
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practices. Unfortunately, they do not adequately consider how
stakeholders evaluate and use the information that companies
disclose, either voluntarily or under force of law. Recent data will
highlight that it may be unwise to make such assumptions about
stakeholder reactions.
Research discussed later in this Article reveals that, although
disclosures are ubiquitous, they have varying degrees of utility.ao
If implemented correctly by legislators and those required to
disclose, disclosures have the potential to eventually lead to changes
in consumer and investor demand, and at some point to shifts in
corporate behavior. In the human rights context, however, disclosures
are not as effective as they could be because they are not widely
disseminated or known, and because not enough stakeholders who do
read disclosures take advantage of their knowledge to press for
corporate reform. Some stakeholders may choose to exit the
relationship with the firm rather than give voice to their concerns.
Others may be apathetic. Still others may assume that someone else
will fight for change, thus leading to a collective action problem where
individuals may choose to take a "free ride" off the activism or work of
others, especially if it is too costly or inconvenient for them to act
themselves.
Accordingly, as legislators consider incentives or laws
intended to change corporate behavior in the human rights context,
they should analyze critically the relative ineffectiveness of the
disclosures that already exist. This will be particularly relevant for
those drafting laws enforcing compliance with the requirement of
developing National Action Plans under the UNGPs. Instead of
relying on ineffective disclosures, legislators should enact laws with
specific and effective penalties, whether civil or criminal, that address
human rights impacts.31
Part II of this Article briefly explains corporate social contract
theory, the role of normative business ethics, and the current balance
of human rights obligations between States and multinational
corporations. Part III highlights the types of current and proposed
transparency and disclosure regimes that States enact, or that firms
impose on themselves, in my view, to avoid more onerous human
rights legislation that may not pass. In Part IV, I discuss the
30. Dearn, supra note 28.
31. Specific solutions are beyond the scope of this paper, which will focus on
the flaws in the current disclosure regime.
[47.1:192
2015] Disclosing Disclosure's Defects 93
effectiveness of disclosures and their effect on consumer behavior.
After a review of data, I argue that, because consumers do not use
disclosures in the manner intended by the drafters-to make
informed decisions-legislators should not rely solely, or even
primarily, on "name and shame" disclosures for human rights
legislation. In Part V, I examine the impact of socially responsible
investors and other shareholders on firm behavior. Although I believe
that disclosures are generally ineffective, I recommend here that
more socially responsible investors adopt the ethical parameters of
the Norwegian Pension Fund. The Pension Fund uses both
teleological and deontological frameworks to make investment and
divestment decisions. I also propose an eight-factor test depending on
the investors' priorities. Part VI briefly concludes.
II. THE CORPORATE SOCIAL CONTRACT, NORMATIVE BUSINESS
ETHICS, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS
In order to determine how to hold companies accountable, we
must first briefly explore what motivates them to act and to change.
First, I will discuss corporate social contract theory and normative
business ethics as tools to analyze corporate motivations. Then, I will
briefly discuss international efforts to establish corporate
accountability for human rights.
Corporations are juridical persons that lack the "conscience"
that otherwise constrains the conduct of their "natural"
counterparts.3 2 Without knowing what and who "motivates" them to
32. In the United States, corporations enjoy many of the privileges of
"people." For example, they have First Amendment rights related to political
spending and the ability to make religious choices. See Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 406 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(treating corporations as persons for the purpose of the First Amendment under
campaign finance laws); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (ruling that Affordable Care Act regulations requiring employers to provide
employees with access to free contraception violated the rights of closely held
corporations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Michael W.
McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J.
412 (2013); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before
and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657 (2012); see also Justin
Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 217
(2010) (discussing the impact of Citizens United in the campaign finance
constellation); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (2015) (discussing the impact of Hobby
Lobby in a corporation's ability to make religious choices). Corporations may also
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act, any legislation, disclosure regime, or incentive program will be
ineffective. Accordingly, lawmakers must ask abstract questions."
Can corporations actually feel "shame?" If so, how much "shame" or
reputational damage must firms experience before they change their
behavior? Legislators and activists, assuming that the corporations
can feel shame, have focused on the "name and shame" laws and
disclosure rules, with the assumption that a business' desire to
preserve its reputation will cause it to act more ethically, even in the
absence of more stringent legislation. 4 If corporations cannot feel
shame, however, then "name and shame" tactics will be ineffective, as
will disclosures based on that premise. Further, are investors and
consumers doing enough to hold firms accountable, and if not, why
not? I argue that the use of disclosures for accountability in the
human rights context has thus far failed to achieve the stated goals.
This Article is premised on the belief that corporations are
not separate moral agents. In the same way that I adopt a
stakeholder view of the firm, I also adopt a view that the firm acts
through its managers, and does not act as a separate moral person."
face criminal liability in the United States, but due to jurisdictional protections, it
is difficult to sue corporations in U.S. federal courts for human rights abuses. See
Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an Affirmative
Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 41 (2012); Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660-61 (2013) (holding that federal
courts may not recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a foreign
sovereign).
33. I will not answer these questions in this Article. I merely pose them for
consideration.
34. See, e.g., Roya Ghafele & Angus Mercer, 'Not Starting in Sixth Gear': An
Assessment of the U.N. Global Compact's Use of Soft Law as a Global Governance
Structure for Corporate Social Responsibility, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
41, 51 (2010) (asserting that naming and shaming is a highly effective strategy,
and the voluntary instrument known as the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) is an excellent example of its success in practice).
35. For more on the debate about corporate moral agency, see Peter A.
French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 Am. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979) (arguing
that a corporation's hierarchy of decision-making and their rules for determining
whether a decision is in the interest of the corporation, as opposed to the interest
of the individual making the decision, makes a corporation a moral agent); John
R. Danley, Corporate Moral Agency: The Case for Anthropological Bigotry, in
ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROFESSIONAL LIFE 269-74 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1988)
(disagreeing that corporations have individual moral agency); Manuel G.
Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do,
2 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1 (1983). For more on the theory of corporate
personhood and the thesis that the U.S. Supreme Court has granted
[ 47.1:194
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These managers may come and go, and may have differing views on
the role of the corporation in society. If the corporation does not act on
its own, then the "corporation" cannot feel shame. Instead, the
corporation's officers and directors, depending on the corporate
culture, make decisions that will enhance or detract from the
corporation's value in light of the appropriate incentives or penalties.
These people are often shielded from liability, to a large extent, due to
various legal protections that make individual prosecution difficult,
thereby leading to potentially high-risk decision-making. If this is the
case, how can legislators best influence those who control the firm?
To answer this question, it is important to understand the
social contract theory, which may underlie legislators' current
reliance on "name and shame" laws and disclosure rules. Although I
believe that corporations have a social contract with society, it is not
adequately enforced. Accordingly, legislation based on a premise of
enforcement by citizens will fail.
A. The Social Contract3 6
Many are familiar with the concept of the social contract
between the government and the governed, as outlined by
philosophers Hobbes," Locke," and Rousseau." Businesses also enter
into social contracts with the States in which they operate, as well as
with the stakeholders around them. Thomas Donaldson and Thomas
Dunfee argue that macrosocial contracts are normative, hypothetical
contracts among economic participants that establish the "moral
constitutional rights to further the interests of the people in the corporation, and
not the corporation itself, see Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate
Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629 (2011).
36. Although other theories such as distributive justice could apply in the
human rights context, this Article will not address them and will focus solely on
social contract theory. For more, see JOHN RAWLS, Distributive Justice, in
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY (Peter Laslett & W.G. Runcimann eds.,
1967). A number of people question why corporations would enter such contracts
at all. See Edward J. Conry, A Critique of Social Contracts for Business, 5 Bus.
ETHICS Q. 187 (1995); Paul F. Hodapp, Can There Be a Social Contract With
Business?, 9 J. Bus. ETHICS 127 (1990).
37. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Classics
1985) (1651).
38. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689).
39. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS (Donald A.
Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publishing 1987) (1778).
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boundaries for any social contracting."o "Moral free space" allows for
the possibility that some cultural and economic norms will differ from
others, but all must adhere to the traditional human rights values.4 1
Paul Neiman categorizes groups of corporate social contracts.42 In one
group, Paul Neiman places those philosophers or ethicists who apply
political philosopher Thomas Hobbes' theory of the state of nature to
justify why firms sign on to sustainability plans and comply with
national laws.4 Others apply John Rawls' principles of justice to
international businesses, arguing that multinationals have a limited
duty of assistance toward those in developing economies. Some
question why businesses would enter into social contracts at all.45
As previously discussed, there is no specific international law
or "hard law" that obligates firms to respect or protect human rights.
In 1948, the UN issued the Universal Declaration of Human Rights46
in response to the atrocities of World War II. The thirty articles of the
Declaration make it clear that every human being deserves equal
respect. Some argue that the Declaration was the basis of a tacit
social contract between business and the State, under which the
State would protect human rights, and business would generate
wealth.47
. If firms and the State have entered into contracts through the
Declaration, I believe that firms have contracted with stakeholders by
taking advantage of "soft law." Soft laws are neither legally binding
"nor completely void of any legal significance," but can transition into
40. See T. Donaldson & T.W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contract Theory, 19(2) ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252
(1994); M. Douglas, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Hype Over Hypernorms,
26(2) J. Bus. ETHICS 101 (2000); T. DONALDSON & T.W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND:
A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999); T. DONALDSON, P.
WERHANE, & J. VAN ZANDT, ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL
APPROACH (8th ed. 2007).
41. Id.
42. Paul Neiman, A Social Contract for International Business Ethics, 114 J.
Bus. ETHICS 75 (2013).
43. Id. (citing E. Palmer, Multinational Corporations and the Social
Contract, 31(3) J. BUS. ETHICS 245 (2001)).
44. See, e.g., Nien-h6 Hsieh, The Obligations of Transnational Corporations:
Rawlsian Justice and the Duty ofAssistance, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q. 643 (2004).
45. See Conry, supra note 36; Hodapp, supra note 36.
46. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
47. Wesley Cragg, Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New
Social Contract, 27 J. BUS. ETHICS 205 (2000).
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customary international law. 4 Masahiko Iwamura provides a
particularly relevant description for this Article's purposes:
"Soft law" refers to norms that are not formal laws
provided by the state. State enforcement of these
norms is not guaranteed, yet people are somehow
bound by them in socio-economic society. These norms
vary in their form; some are provided by the state
(e.g., regulatory guidelines by ministries etc.), some by
businesses or the markets themselves (e.g., self-
regulation by industry associations or general
standards of business ethics and etiquette etc.), and
some are established by the international community
(e.g., model laws, resolutions or guidelines of
international organizations etc.). Contemporary
business laws contain many elusively defined soft
laws which play an important role, and which have a
significant impact on business activities.49
The United Nations has long promoted a theory of a social
contract between business and society, explaining:
[Tihe intellectual foundation for most evolving views
of corporate social responsibility lies largely with the
notion of a "social contract" between a corporation and
its host society . . .. This social contract incorporates a
firm's contractual legal obligations but extends
beyond them to include additional expectations or
responsibilities that are not (currently) mandatory.
The contents of a corporation's social contract can
evolve more rapidly than its legal charter, reflecting a
society's changing social and cultural mores. When
governed parties, such as corporations, are slow to
comply with new societal values, those norms may
then be formulated into legally-binding mandates. 'o
The United States Department of Labor ("DOL") has
integrated the concept of a corporate social contract into the context
48. See MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw, 30, 52-53
(4th ed. 2003).
49. Soft Law and the State-Market Relationship-Forming a Base for
Education and Research of Private Ordering, THE UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO GLOBAL
COE, http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/coe/english/list/category4/basel2/summary.html
(last visited Aug. 2, 2015).
50. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz.,
Oct. 1999, The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF (Oct. 1999).
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of the employer/employee relationship. In a 1999 report for the DOL
Office of the Secretary, MIT Professor Thomas Kochan studied three
companies and their relationship with their employees. " He defined
the social contract as:
[Tihe mutual expectations and obligations that
employees, employers, and society at large has for
work and employment relationships . . . [which arise]
from a constellation of factors, including one's career
aspirations, occupational norms, education and
professional training, macro economic trends and
performance, and societal value regarding democracy,
freedom of expression and association, equity and
fairness, etc.52
The private sector has also recognized the concept of a
corporate social contract. In 2005, Ian Davis, the managing director of
global consulting firm McKinsey & Company, called the "social
contract" the "biggest contract"; he decried traditional corporate social
responsibility as too "defensive," and Milton Friedman's "the business
of business is business" shareholder maximization model as too
myopic." As Davis pointed out:
[Miore than two centuries ago, Rousseau's social
contract helped to seed the idea among political
leaders that they must serve the public good, lest
their own legitimacy be threatened. The CEOs of
today's big corporations should take the opportunity
to restate and reinforce their own social contracts in
order to help secure, for the long term, the invested
billions of their shareholders.5 4
While Smith differentiates between the social contract and
corporate social responsibility ("CSR"), Georg Kell, the executive
director of the UN Global Compact, and John Ruggie, author of the
UNGPs, explicitly link the two, observing, "CSR can be understood as
the conditions under which society grants private corporations the
51. Thomas Kochan, Rebuilding the Social Contract at Work: Lessons from
the Leading Cases, 51 (Inst. for Work & Emp't Research, Task Force Working
Paper No. WPO9, 1999).
52. Thomas A. Kochan, Reconstructing America's Social Contract in
Employment: The Role of Policy, Institutions, and Practices, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
137, 138 (1999).
53. Ian Davis, The Biggest Contract: By Building Social Issues Into Strategy,
Big Business Can Recast the Debate About Its Role, THE ECONOMIST (May 26,
2005), http://www.economist.com/node/4008642.
54. Id.
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right to pursue the maximization of profits. This social contract
between a corporation and its host society implies legal requirements
or can be understood to include implicit assumptions and
expectations."5 5
Firms benefit from the lack of mandatory legal obligations by
issuing corporate social responsibility reports, or by participating in
the types of voluntary initiatives discussed below.56 Some firms also
take advantage of the lack of State enforcement for various human
rights violations, particularly when firms are complicit with, but not
directly responsible for, abuses." Furthermore, as I will argue later,
key stakeholders, such as consumers and investors, generally fail to
enforce breaches of these social contracts, either because they do not
care, or because they do not have the right information to judge the
firms. In many instances, they do not have the legal recourse to take
action. Thus, stakeholders fail to threaten either the legitimacy of the
social contract between the TNC and society, or the legitimacy of the
TNC itself. This allows some firms to do the minimum necessary to
operate in their home or host state.
B. Normative Business Ethics
Given the lack of enforcement of corporate social contracts,
the field of normative business ethics, which views the world through
ethical frameworks, can provide guidance for firms, regulators, and
other stakeholders to judge corporate actions. A lengthy discussion of
the different schools of thought is beyond the scope of this Article,
although these principles form the basis of the ethical framework for
investors that I propose in Part IV.
Briefly, some ethicists subscribe to the teleological schools of
thought, such as utilitarianism, and focus on the importance of
consequences. 5 Applying this to the business context, a decision
55. GEORG KELL & JOHN G. RUGGIE, GLOBAL MARKETS AND SOCIAL
LEGITIMACY: THE CASE OF THE 'GLOBAL COMPACT" (Oct. 16, 2015),
http://www.yorku.ca/drache/talks/pdflapd-ruggiekellfin.pdf.
56. See Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice,
12(1) INT'L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 101-02 (2010).
57. I discuss the concept of complicity in more detail in the text
accompanying notes 71-77.
58. Major proponents of utilitarianism include Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Clarendon Press 1879).
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concerning business conduct is ethical only if that decision produces
the greatest good for the greatest number of individuals." This theory
logically leads to a cost-benefit analysis, and could allow for a self-
serving definition of "the greatest good" or "the greatest number of
individuals." The TNC can determine what is "right" by looking at the
consequences. Cynically, this can also allow the TNC to take
whatever means are necessary to achieve those ends, including being
complicit in controversial behavior to achieve the "greatest good." For
example, firms often operate in countries with minimal safety
standards or civil liberties, because it is cheaper to operate there, and
therefore conceivably "better" for the cost-conscious shareholder.
Often, these firms provide the locale's major source of income and pay
depressed wages, capitalizing on the fact that the labor laws are
unenforced or under-enforced. If the company employs a large
number of people, provides cheap goods for consumers, and satisfies
shareholders, this may justify the act of joining the "race to the
bottom.""o
Others subscribe to a Kantian point of view, the deontological
theory that companies should do the right thing. " Value
considerations do not come into play because the firm has a duty to do
what is inherently right, not to achieve any certain goal or to avoid
any consequences. Firms that tout the maxim to "do the right thing
because it's the right thing to do" utilize a Kantian perspective
59. See The Report From the Graver Committee, GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY
(Nov. 11, 2003), https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/Report-on-ethical-
guidelines/id420232/ (discussing both theories in the context of Norway's Pension
Fund and explaining that "[miost people would support a requirement prohibiting
complicity in actions that may result in the loss of human lives unless there are
strong reasons for such complicity and unless the decision is made on justifiable
grounds. The recent debate on the reasons for supporting or opposing the war
against Iraq is an illustration of this."). Norway's Fund will be discussed in
greater detail in Part IV.
60. For a discussion of governmental responses to address international
labor issues related to the race to the bottom or "social dumping," see Michael J.
Trebilcock, Trade Policy and Labour Standards: Objectives, Instruments, and
Institutions at 10-11 (Univ. of Toronto, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 02-01,
2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=307219.
61. JAMES BRussEAu, THE BusINEss ETHICS WORKSHOP, V. 1.0 682 (2012),
http://2012books.lardbucket.org/pdfs/business-ethics.pdf (arguing against theories
of corporate social responsibility-including deontological ethics-for, inter alia,
the following reasons: (1) corporations cannot have ethical responsibilities; (2)
corporate executives are only duty-bound to pursue profits; (3) corporations are ill-
equipped to directly serve the public good; and (4) social issues should be managed
by government, not corporations).
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(although of course, they may act differently in practice). From a
deontological perspective, some actions would be unethical under any
circumstances.
An Aristotelian approach focuses on "virtues" and
membership in a larger community.6 2 This approach explains the
multi-stakeholder initiatives and public-private partnerships that
provide hybrid, privatized forms of governance. Three key multi-
stakeholder initiatives relevant to human rights include the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, " outlining
guidelines for private security forces; the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative,"4 providing standards for transparency in
the extraction of natural resources; and the Kimberley Process, 6
relating to conflict diamonds. All are, in my view, examples of
nonbinding, but highly influential, social contracts. 6
As I will discuss throughout the Article, although I believe
that there is a social contract between business and society, it is
poorly enforced by stakeholders, at least as it relates to human rights.
Before addressing the reasons why, I turn now to the other
alternatives for imposing corporate accountability for human rights.
C. The United Nations Approach to Corporate Accountability
In this section, I will outline several UN mechanisms for
addressing corporate human rights impacts and their degrees of
success. These initiatives include the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), a proposed 2014 UN Treaty, and the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
62. See Robert C. Solomon, Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An
Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics in Ethical Issues in Business, 2 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 317, 319 (1992).
63. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, VOLUNTARY
PRINCIPLES, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
64. What Is the EITI?, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
https://eiti.org (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).
65. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited
Mar. 4, 2015).
66. See Scott Jerbi, Assessing the Roles of Multistakeholder Initiatives in
Advancing the Business and Human Rights Agenda, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
1027 (2012).
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1. The ICCPR
The United States and 166 other countries have ratified the
ICCPR, which, among other things, requires State parties to enact
legislation, protective measures, and remedies for the guaranteed
rights to life and human dignity; freedom from slavery; equality
before the law; freedom of speech, assembly, and association; freedom
of religion; protections in criminal proceedings and the right to a fair
trial; and minority rights.67 The ICCPR does not bind corporations,
but it requires States to protect citizens from violations by the State,
as well as by other citizens, including corporations.
At times, though, contrary to the ICCPR, the State and the
TNC work together to infringe upon human rights, making it
difficult, if not impossible, for injured parties to seek redress in their
home state. The United Nations has specific guidelines regarding
corporate accountability for complicity. This Article adopts the UN
Global Compact definition of complicity: "[a]n act or omission (failure
to act) by a company, or individual representing a company, that
'helps' (facilitates, legitimizes, assists, encourages, etc.) another, in
some way, to carry out a human rights abuse, and the knowledge by
the company that its act or omission could provide such help."69
Citing the Guiding Principles, the UN Global Compact, discussed in
more detail in Part III.A, makes clear that firms have an obligation to
respect human rights and conduct appropriate due diligence, even if
the legal definition of criminal complicity may not apply.o
The UN Global Compact outlines three categories of
complicity." Companies are "directly complicit" when they provide
67. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14.
68. John G. Ruggie, State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate
Corporate Activities Under the United Nations' Core Human Rights Treaties,
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (June 1, 2007),
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-
materials/Ruggie-ICCPR-Jun-2007.pdf; Civil and Political Rights: The Human
Rights Committee, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTs, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheetl5rev.len.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
69. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact: Principle Two: Human
Rights, UN GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-ge/
mission/principles/principle-2 (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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goods or services that they know will be used to carry out abuse.7 2
Companies are guilty of "beneficial complicity" when they do not take
any specific actions to carry out abuse but nonetheless benefit from
it." Finally, a company that remains silent in the face of "systematic
or continuous human rights abuse" is "silently complicit," even
though the company may not face legal liability.74 In 2008, before
developing the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, UN Special Representative John Ruggie
acknowledged that,
[Mlere presence where an abuse occurs, or deriving
from the abuse itself, is unlikely to result in legal
liability for complicity . . . . From a company
perspective, legal liability does not represent the only
concern or risk, and companies need guidance that
considers more than what law currently can provide-
but which the analysis of social norms, or a company's
social license to operate, would encompass.7
The UNGPs are Ruggie's attempt to provide this guidance.
Many, however, believe that the UNGPs and these
unenforceable complicity guidelines are not enough. They argue that
it is time to change the current state of affairs in which there are no
72. See Vranica, Mickle, & Robinson, supra note 4 (highlighting that
although FIFA sponsor Johnson & Johnson was so concerned about the corruption
allegations that it tried to insert a "morals" clause into its contract for the 2014
World Cup-language that essentially would let the company pull out of a
sponsorship arrangement if FIFA's reputation were badly damaged-FIFA
refused to sign the contract with the morals clause, and Johnson & Johnson
nonetheless continued to sponsor FIFA, though it decided not to renew its
contract after the 2014 World Cup).
73. Id.
74. Id. Recently, Daewoo Int'l Corp., a South Korean company, has been
subject to pressure to stop purchasing cotton from Uzbekistan, which allows the
use of forced and child labor. Daewoo defended its involvement by claiming that,
although forced labor may be used in the growing and harvesting of cotton, no
forced labor is used in the company's processing plants in the country. See Jeyup
S. Kwaak, Posco Unit Admits Using Cotton From Forced and Child Labor, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/daewoo-faces-criticism-for-use-
of-uzbekistan-cotton-made-with-forced-labor-1407918539.
75. See Letter from John G. Ruggie, UN Secretary-General's Special
Representative for Business and Human Rights, to Carlos Lopez, Legal Officer of
International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, Switz. (Sept. 12, 2008),
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/
Ruggie-comments-ICJ-complicity-report-12-Sep-2008.pdf.
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treaties or international laws specifically requiring corporations to
protect, or even respect, human rights.
As discussed previously, the 1999 UN statement about
corporate social contracts leaves open the possibility that corporations
that are slow to adapt to changing societal norms may face legally
binding mandates. For these and other reasons, a renewed effort for a
binding treaty to hold corporations accountable is currently
underway. 7 As discussed below, though, an international treaty is
not likely to pass in the near future. Thus, stakeholders will have to
address their grievances through either a patchwork of under-
enforced local laws, or whatever level of voluntary commitments
TNCs choose to make.
2. The Proposed UN Treaty
At the 24th Session of the Human Rights Council in
September 2013, Ecuador introduced a proposal calling for the
creation of an open-ended working group to research and elaborate on
an international, legally binding treaty governing the actions of
multinational corporations with regard to human rights abuses.7 ' The
Resolution aims to develop a treaty that will provide a valid
enforcement mechanism, providing for greater predictability and
76. See Jena Martin, "The End of the Beginning": A Comprehensive Look at
the U.N.'s Business and Human Rights Agenda From a Bystander Perspective, 17
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 871 (2012) (noting additionally that (1) it is difficult
to hold TNCs accountable in host countries with weak governance systems; (2)
international human rights law focuses exclusively on state actors; (3)
jurisdictional issues often bar relief in transnational litigation; (4) transnational
corporations often have complex structures and subsidiaries that can hide their
role in wrongdoing; and (5) corporations will claim to be "bystanders" and merely
witnesses but not participants to the human rights abuses perpetrated by the
state of the community around them).
77. African Group, Arab Group, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, Cuba,
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador, Statement on Behalf of a
Group of Countries at the 24rd Session of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 2013),
http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/medialdocuments/statement-
unhrc-legally-binding.pdf.
78. Id.; see also In Controversial Landmark Resolution, Human Rights
Council Takes First Step Toward Treaty on Transnational Corporations' Human
Rights Obligations, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE RESOURCE CENTER (July 15, 2014),
http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/07/15/in-controversial-landmark-resolution-human-
rights-council-takes-first-step-toward-treaty-on-transnational-corporations-
human-rights-obligations.
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uniform legal standards for all transnational corporations." A group
of more than 600 organizations quickly joined to form the Treaty
Movement in support of the proposed legislation;so however, many
well-known organizations have argued against a binding treaty.8 1
After significant debate, in June 2014, the UN voted to adopt
Ecuador's resolution (co-drafted by South Africa) by a narrow
margin,82 with twenty countries voting for the resolution, fourteen
countries voting against, and thirteen countries abstaining." The
79. Notes of the Workshop and Public Debate at Notre Dame Law School,
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Does the World Need a Treaty on
Business and Human Rights? Weighing the Pros and Cons (May 14, 2014),
http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/note-event_
doestheworldneed_a_treaty-on..business andhumanjrights21-5-14.pdf.
80. Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, TREATY ALLIANCE,
www.treatymovement.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
81. Among the organizations protesting the proposed treaty are the
International Chamber of Commerce. See ICC Disappointed by Ecuador Initiative
Adoption, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (June 30, 2014),
http://iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2014/ICC-disappointed-by-Ecuador-Initiative-
adoption/). For International Organization of Employers, see Consensus on
Business and Human Rights Is Broken with the Adoption of the Ecuador
Initiative, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF EMPLOYERS (June 26, 2014),
http://www.ioe-emp.org/index.php?id=1238 (finding the adoption of the resolution
to be a setback as it "has broken the unanimous consensus on business and
human rights" established by the Guiding Principles); Letter From Human Rights
Watch to the UN Human Rights Council Re: Business and Human Rights, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (June 10, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/10/letter-un-
human-rights-council-re-business-and-human-rights (calling for an investigation
designed to identify specific protections that need to be put into place at a later
date rather than beginning to negotiate a legally binding treaty immediately).
82. See Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an International Legally
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises With Respect to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev. 1 (June
24, 2014) [hereinafter Elaboration of an International Legally Binding
Instrument]; see also Latest Developments on Business and Human Rights at the
UN Human Rights Council, INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUSINESS,
http://www.ihrb.org/pdfl2014-06-UN-HRC.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2015)
(summarizing the resolution introduced by Ecuador at the 26th Session in June
2014).
83. Latest Developments on Business and Human Rights at the UN Human
Rights Council, supra note 82. The countries voting for the resolution were
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia,
South Africa, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The countries voting against the
resolution were Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Montenegro, South Korea, Romania, Macedonia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States of America. The countries abstaining from the
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passed resolution established an intergovernmental working group
designed to develop a binding treaty that requires States to bear the
primary responsibility for protecting against human rights abuses,
including those by TNCs operating in their jurisdictions."
Notably, the proposal targets only TNCs, and would not affect
the operations of local companies, which employ the vast majority of
people in the affected countries." As an example, in the context of the
Bangladesh Rana Plaza collapse, the proposed treaty would affect
transnational corporations doing business with the factories housed
in the collapsed building, but not the local factory owners."
The vote was a source of controversy, with some governments
opposed to the proposal stating that they would not cooperate with
the new working group created by this resolution. 8 Those who
supported Ecuador's resolution argued that it was designed to
address the "dangerous 'governance gap' between the powerful
globalising [sic] forces, and the often weak capacity of societies to cope
with the problems and damage these forces can create." "
Additionally, proponents claimed that the current system of non-
binding legislation enacted by the Ruggie Principles had not achieved
consensus over implementation, and as such, had not had the
intended effect on business policies and practices." Many, including
Ruggie, viewed these as part of a wider program of changing the
normative framework in which to then build further change.
vote were Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait,
Maldives, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and the United Arab
Emirates.
84. Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument, supra note
82.
85. Arvind Ganesan, Dispatches: A Treaty to End Corporate Abuses?, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Jul. 1, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/01/dispatches-
treaty-end-corporate-abuses. Indeed, in the opening remarks of the 2014 UN
Forum on Business and Human Rights, the Chair, Mo Ibrahim, pointed out that
most people in the world do not work for TNCs and thus more small and medium
sized enterprises should have been present and represented at the forum. Mo
Ibrahim, Chairperson of the 3rd Forum, Welcome Remarks at the Forum on
Business & Human Rights 2014 (Dec. 2, 2014), http://webtv.un.org/watch/
welcome-remarks-forum-on-business-and-human-rights-20143932050755001.
86. Ganesan, supra note 85.
87. Latest Developments on Business and Human Rights at the UN Human
Rights Council, supra note 82.
88. Notes of the Workshop and Public Debate at Notre Dame Law School,
supra note 79.
89. Id.
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In contrast, those opposed to Ecuador's proposal claimed that
the resolution would create discord, and would undermine the
progress being made on the implementation of the UNGPs."0 Ruggie
himself stated that the proposal was overly broad, as it was intended
to create a binding legal document to govern all business conduct in
relation to any human rights abuse." Despite the overly broad nature
of the subject matter governed by the resolution, many opponents
were unsatisfied with the narrow reach it proposed.9 2
The opponents of Ecuador's resolution favored, instead, a
contrasting proposal from Norway, backed by twenty-two countries,
which was adopted the next day." This resolution sought to extend
the mandate of the existing UN Working Group on Business and
Human Rights for an additional three years, in order to promote
domestic remedies, address corporate involvement in finding a
solution, and investigate the strengths and weaknesses of a legally
binding instrument regulating corporate actions.94
In his closing remarks at the Third UN Forum on Business
and Human Rights, Ruggie urged States to continue implementing
the UNGPs through "a smart mix of [voluntary and involuntary]
measures."' He spoke hopefully about the progress that had been
90. Stephen Townley, Member of the Delegation of the United States of
America: Proposed Working Group Would Undermine Efforts to Implement
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (June 26, 2014),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/06/26/proposed-working-group-would-
undermine-efforts-to-implement-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-
rights/ ("The focus will turn to the new instrument, and companies, states, and
others are unlikely to invest significant time and money in implementing the
Guiding Principles if they see divisive discussions here in Geneva.").
91. John G. Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN
Business and Human Rights Treaty, INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
AND BUSINESS (Jul. 8, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/board/past-as-
prologue.html.
92. In Controversial Landmark Resolution, supra note 78 (noting that
Human Rights Watch stated that "the UN's decision is too narrow since it only
focuses on transnational corporations and will not address national or other
businesses that should also be required to respect human rights").
93. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1 (June 23, 2014).
94. Irene Pietropaoli, High Tide in Lake Geneva: Business and Human
Rights Events at the 26th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, BUSINESS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (June 27, 2014), http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/high-tide-in_ lake-geneva.pdf
95. John G. Ruggie, Former UN Special Representative for Business &
Human Rights, Closing Plenary Remarks at the Third United Nations Forum on
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made in the three years since the adoption of the Guiding Principles,
stating that they "are becoming embedded in the regulatory
ecosystem for business and human rights . . . expand[ing] from the
international to the national and local spheres."96 Finally, Ruggie
specified three key characteristics that he believes to be necessary to
any attempt to create binding legislation: (1) the treaty must account
for diversity in cultural and economic systems of the home countries
for transnational corporations; (2) the treaty should encompass all
businesses, not only transnational corporations; and (3) the treaty
should, instead of creating a broad, abstract prohibition against all
abuses, be targeted to address those gaps that the Guiding Principles
are unable to address.9 7
It may be no coincidence that the States that tended to vote in
favor of Ecuador's proposal had largely failed to implement the
Guiding Principles by June 2014.98 Cynics might suggest that these
States may support the treaty as an attempt to distract the world
from the Guiding Principles and slow the progress that Ruggie has
achieved. The UNGPs and other voluntary mechanisms, which I
consider social contracts, are discussed in more detail below.
3. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights"
The fate of the proposed treaty is uncertain, but many do not
hold much hope for its passage. 00 Accordingly, while not abandoning
the debate, many stakeholders have focused more on the UNGPs,
which, as discussed earlier, have three pillars-the State duty to
Business & Human Rights (Dec. 3, 2014), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/
default/files/documents/ruggie-un-forum-dec-2014.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. John G. Ruggie, Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and
Human Rights Treaty Sponsors, INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-
business.html.
99. See Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an
Affirmative Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 41 (2012)
(discussing the history of attempts to implement binding legislation on companies
and the precursors to the Guiding Principles).
100. In Controversial Landmark Resolution, supra note 78 (highlighting that
Guiding Principles author John Ruggie fears that advocates and opponents of a
business and human rights treaty may be "on a collision course.").
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protect human rights, the corporate duty to respect human rights,
and the joint duty to provide access to remedies for grievances.ox
The UNGPs do not bind businesses, but instead discuss
specific human rights due diligence processes and obligations, and a
number of firms have modeled their human rights policies on them. 02
In sum, the UNGPs require firms to commit to a policy of respecting
human rights. Firms must conduct due diligence to identify, prevent,
and mitigate their human rights impact, and must report on those
efforts to affected stakeholders. 103 Firms must also implement
appropriate remediation procedures to address adverse human rights
impacts that they cause."0 ' The thirty-one UNGPs recommend that
business enterprises, regardless of size, conduct due diligence
throughout their supply chains, looking for actual and potential
human rights impacts; integrate and act upon the findings; track
responses; and then publicly communicate how the firm has
addressed the impacts. ' They also recommend that companies
mitigate risks and provide remedies for the impacts they cause, or
those to which they contribute.1 0 6 UNGP 12 explains that the theory
101. Id. (noting that John Ruggie stressed that a treaty on corporate human
rights liability could take years to emerge, and that "business and human rights is
not so discrete an issue-area as to lend itself to a single set of detailed treaty
obligations").
102. See Michael Kourbas, Adidas Creates Human Rights Complaint Process,
TRIPLE PUNDIT (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.triplepundit.com/2014/11/adidas-
announces-human-rights-complaint-process; Microsoft on the Issues:
Commemorating International Human Rights Day, MICROsOFT CORPORATE
BLOGS (Dec. 10, 2014), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/12/10/
commemorating-international-human-rights-day; Corporate Citizenship,
MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/working-
responsibly/principled-business-practices/human-rights (last visited Mar. 5, 2015);
see also Evidence of Corporate Disclosure Relevant to the U.N. Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, SHIFT (June 2014), http://www.shiftproject.org/
publicationlevidence-corporate-disclosure-relevant-un-guiding-principles-
business-and-human-rights-0 (discussing a 2014 study on how forty-three
companies have integrated the UNGPs into their operations and disclosures).
103. See Guiding Principles, supra note 15, 1 17.
104. Id. 1[ 18.
105. Id. I 17-21. For a detailed discussion of the development of the
UNGPs, as well as some criticisms, see Larry Cati Backer, From Institutional
Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding Principles for the
Implementation of the United Nations' "Protect, Respect and Remedy" and the
Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
Bus. & DEV. L.J. 69 (2012).
106. See Backer, supra note 105 (summarizing UNGP 22).
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of corporate responsibility respecting human rights stems from the
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 1o7 the
International Conventions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and Civil and Political Rights; 108 and the International Labour
Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work.o0 A number of the principles are similar to what firms have
already committed to through their corporate social responsibility
programs or other voluntary industry or multi-stakeholder
initiatives, which will be discussed in Part III of this Article.
To comply with the first pillar, the States must develop
National Action Plans ("NAPs") as part of their responsibility to
implement and disseminate the UNGPs. These NAPs are the
mechanism for States to "recognize the normative validity of the
Guiding Principles.""'o As of the time of this writing, only a few
countries-Denmark, "' Finland, 112 Italy, 113 the Netherlands, " the
107. Guiding Principles, supra note 15, 1 12. See Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14.
109. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and
Its Follow-up, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/
declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 5,
2015).
110. Damiano de Felice & Andreas Graf, The Potential of National Action
Plans to Implement Human Rights Norms: An Early Assessment With Respect to
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 7 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC.
40, 43-44 (2015) (noting "significant gaps between commitment and compliance"
for human rights initiatives by states and recommending that NAPs be drafted
using the following criteria: "(1) be based on a comprehensive baseline study/gap
analysis; (2) include all relevant state agencies; (3) allow effective multi-
stakeholder participation; and (4) envisage continuity, in particular through
monitoring of implementation," and in terms of content, "NAPs should: (5) express
firm commitment to implement the UN documents; (6) conform as much as
possible to the structure and substance of the UN Guiding Principles; (7) offer
unambiguous commitments and (8) envisage capacity-building").
111. THE DANISH GOVERNMENT, DANISH NATIONAL ACTION PLAN-
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Mar. 2014), http://ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/NationalPlans/
DenmarkNationalPlanBHR.pdf (citing the Rana Plaza disaster and noting that
firms needed to add social responsibility to their business plans and consumers
needed to consider social responsibility when making purchasing decisions).
112. MINISTRY OF EMPLOYMENT & THE ECONOMY OF COMPETITIVENESS,
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2014), http://www.tem.fl/files/
41214/TEMjul_46_2014_webEN_21102014.pdf (indicating that "key aims for the
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UK,"1 ' and Spain"' -had completed NAPs, while almost twenty,
including the United States, had announced plans to begin the
consultation and drafting process. "' It is no surprise that the
countries that have completed their plans come from the EU, given
the EU's prioritization of business and human rights issues.18
action plan are the legislative report, definition of the due diligence obligation,
and the application of social criteria in procurement.").
113. The Foundations of the Italian Action Plan on the United Nations
"Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights," BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS
RESOURCE CENTRE, http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/medial
documents/foundations-ungps-nap-italy.pdf (focusing on the first and third pillars,
the State duty and the joint duty to provide access to remedy, and discussing use
of foreign direct investment and export credits to facilitate improvements in
human rights).
114. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON BUSINESS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2014), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/
documents/netherlands-national-action-plan.pdf (discussing the sustainable
procurement policy implemented in 2013; the need for domestic and international
policy coherence; incorporating the UNGPs and OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises into trade and investment agreements; clarifying the
meaning of due diligence, including for the government itself in its own practices;
promoting greater company awareness of the UNGPs; and examining existing and
proposed transparency and reporting requirements).
115. HM GOVERNMENT, GOOD BUSINESS, IMPLEMENTING THE UN GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/medialdocuments/foundations-ungps-nap-
italy.pdf (observing that the "Government supports the approach set out in the
UNGPs, and is determined to help companies implement it. This should be at the
heart of a company's core operations; it is not the same as philanthropy or social
investment. The responsibility of businesses to respect human rights exists
independently of States' abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human
rights obligations.").
116. GOBIERNO DE ESPARA, PLAN DE EMPRESA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS (2014),
http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/pnedh-borrador-
julio-2014.pdf.
117. Christopher Smart, Announcement of Opportunity to Provide Input into
the U.S. National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/20/
announcement-opportunity-provide-input-us-national-action-plan-responsible-
business; USG National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct,
HUMANRIGHTS.GOV (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/2015/usg-
national-action-plan-on-responsible-business-conduct/.
118. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, EU STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AND
ACTION PLAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 3, (2012),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/
131181.pdf (stating that the "EU will encourage and contribute to implementation
of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights").
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The key question, then, is how the governments in their
National Action Plans will compel or incentivize companies to
prioritize human rights. Assuming that firms have established social
contracts with the State and with stakeholders, how will stakeholders
know that the firm has violated the contract? Which stakeholders
enforce these contracts and how, particularly when firms are
complicit in human rights abuses perpetrated by States?
Many lawmakers, reluctant to pass strict national or
international human rights laws, have assumed that disclosure can
play a critical role, and that the marketplace will legislate. This, I
believe, is a mistake. Unless there are significant legal or market-
based penalties (and there are none so far), States will abrogate their
duties to protect human rights from abuses perpetrated by non-state
actors. I discuss some of these disclosures in Part III below.
III. THE ERA OF DISCLOSURE
In 1913, future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis coined
one of his most famous sayings: "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants . . . ."" Writing about the money trusts of the
early twentieth century, Brandeis argued for disclosure of bankers'
commissions or profits when they issued securities. But he also
warned that the disclosure should be "real," "obligatory," and to the
actual investor, because filing with a regulator, or allowing investors
to waive the disclosures, would be ineffective.120
One hundred years later, legislators and regulators around
the world are grappling with the same issues of disclosure and
transparency. Notably, when the UN first attempted to gather
information about the rate of progress related to the UNGPs in 2013,
only twenty-six of the 193 member States responded.121 At that time,
sixteen States "encouraged" businesses to report on human rights.
Ten of the sixteen mandated these reports, five made them voluntary,
and one had a hybrid of mandatory and voluntary requirements.1 22 A
119. Justice Louis D. Brandeis, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY,
http://www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2015).
120. Id.
121. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
A/HRC/23/32/Add.2 (Apr. 16, 2013).
122. Id. 11 9.
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new initiative by the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre,
announced in February 2015, will monitor both companies' and
countries' progress on reducing negative human rights impacts.1 23
Interestingly, a higher percentage of companies (fifty-two percent)
than countries (forty percent) responded to the initial disclosure
inquiries.
The following section will examine the issue of disclosure
more closely. 124
A. Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives
By now, consumers are used to the term "corporate social
responsibility," and expect most large TNCs, and even smaller firms,
to have some commitment, if not a full-fledged program, devoted to it.
Some of the corporate social responsibility initiatives discussed below
also constitute social contracts.
A number of binding and non-binding regimes have been
inspired largely, but not solely, by the Guiding Principles. For
example, many firms produce corporate social responsibility reports1 2 1
using the Global Reporting Initiative ("GRI") sustainability
framework to report on environmental, social, and governance
factors. GRI, a non-profit which partners with the UN Global
Compact and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD"), cites to the Ruggie Principles. GRI requires
companies to examine their operational governance, human rights,
labor, environmental factors, fair operating practices, consumer
issues, community involvement, and development.'2 6 As of 2013, more
than 4,000 organizations had released a GRI report or a GRI-
123. See Launch: Corporate & Government Action on Human Rights Revealed,
BUSINESS & HUmAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, http://business-
humanrights.org/en/launch-corporate-government-action-on-human-rights-
revealed (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
124. Id.
125. Some firms call their reports "sustainability reports," which are often
synonymous with corporate social responsibility, ESG ("environmental, social and
governance"), or non-financial reports. See loannis Ioannou & George Serafeim,
The Consequences of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Evidence
from Four Countries 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-100, 2014),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/11-100-7f383b79-8dad-462d-
90df-324e298acb49.pdf.
126. What Is GRI?, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE,
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-is-GRI/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
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referenced report.127 Nonetheless, GRI acknowledges that fewer than
ten percent of the world's 45,000 publicly-traded companies publicly
disclose information about environmental, social, and governance
factors.128 In 2013, GRI introduced the G4 version of its framework,
which requires the consideration of "materiality" (as defined in
securities law) in reporting for the first time in GRI reports.129
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the
"Guidelines") are voluntary, government-backed principles for
responsible business conduct in labor, environment, information
disclosure, bribery, consumer interests, technology, competition, and
taxation, for participants operating in or from adhering countries."o
The Guidelines require risk-based due diligence within the supply
chain. 1 3 1 In 2011, the OECD amended the Guidelines to adopt the
UNGPs, and added a human rights section.1 32
The UN Global Compact, - another voluntary disclosure
regime, originated in January 1999, when UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan asked business leaders to "initiate a global compact of shared
values and principles, which will give a human face to the global
127. ERNST & YOUNG & THE BOSTON COLLEGE CENTER FOR CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP, VALUE OF SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 18 (2014), http://ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/EY - Value-ofsustainability.reporting/$FILE/EY-
Value-of-Sustainability-Reporting.pdf.
128. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, ANNUAL ACTIVITY REVIEW 2012/13
FROM INFORMATION TO TRANSFORMATION: THE NEXT STEP IN SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING 26, https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-Activity-
Report-2012-13.pdf.
129. G4 Development Process, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE,
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/g4/g4-developments/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015). Under the current public company reporting regime in
the United States, information is "material" if there is "a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of the information made
available." TSC Indus. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
130. See About the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/
about/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). The OECD has thirty-four member countries,
including the United States, and works to promote policies to improve the
economic and social well being of people around the world, including citizens of
nonmember States. Id.
131. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 2011
EDITION (2011), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf.
132. Id.
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market."" The Global Compact asks companies to commit to ten
principles related to human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-
corruption. 134 As of June 2014, the Global Compact had 8,000
business participants from 145 countries around the world. 13s
Compact members must issue an annual Communication on
Progress, disclosing how they have implemented the principles and
their support for other UN development goals. 136 Despite the
disclosure, many NGOs accuse Global Compact companies of
"bluewashing" to appear as though they had the UN's imprimatur for
their CSR programs. 137 Moreover, although critics complain that
there are no independent monitoring requirements,3 3 hundreds of
members are expelled each year for failing to complete their
reports.1as
133. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic
Forum in Davos, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.un.org/press/
en/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
134. See UN Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Work
of the Organization, 1 46, U.N. Doc. A/61/1 (Aug. 16, 2006); see also Overview
of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
135. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, UN Global Compact Participants,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2015).
136. UN Global Compact Expels 285 Companies in First Half of 2014, UNITED
NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/1151-07-14-
2014 (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
137. See Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, From Norms to Programs: The
United Nations Global Compact and Global Governance, REGULATION &
GOVERNANCE (2012), http://faculty.washington.edu/aseem/gc.pdf (noting that
"[v]oluntary programs which do not impose real obligations on firms or do not
back them with sufficient monitoring-bluewashing or astroturfs-have a greater
chance of failure"). For the origins of the term "bluewashing," see Kenny Bruno &
Joshua Karliner, Tangled Up in Blue, Corporate Partnerships at the United
Nations, CORPWATCH.ORG (Sept. 1, 2000), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
corpwatch.org/downloads/tangled.pdf.
138. See Berliner & Prakash, supra note 137, at 36 (observing that the
Compact represents "excessive compromise" and requires only "beyond marginal
compliance").
139. UN Global Compact Expels 657 Companies in 2014, UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL COMPACT (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/1621-
01-14-2015. Georg Kell, Executive Director of the UN Global Compact, has stated
that only fifteen percent of the Global 1000 participating in the program are likely
"sincere" or "serious" about sustainability. Stephen J. Dubner, Is Good Corporate
Citizenship Also Good for the Bottom Line?, FREAKONOMICS (Apr. 19, 2012),
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B. Legally Required Disclosure in the United States
TNCs based in the United States must comply (when
applicable) with at least four legally required disclosures related to
human rights: Dodd-Frank § 1502 (conflict minerals) 140; the
California Transparency in Supply Chains Actl41 ; a number of rules
that apply to federal contractors, discussed in the footnote below'42 ;
and the Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements.1 43
1. Conflict Minerals: Dodd-Frank § 1502
Under Dodd-Frank § 1502, known as the conflict-minerals
provision, all companies, regardless of size, that file reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") under Sections 13(a) or
15(d) of the Exchange Act'44 must conduct due diligence and report
the origin of minerals in their products from the Democratic Republic
of Congo or adjoining countries. 145 The law's drafters wanted to
http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/04/19/is-good-corporate-citizenship-also-good-
for-the-bottom-line/.
140. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, 12
U.S.C. § 5301 (2010).
141. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43
(2012).
142. The Federal Acquisition Regulations requires prospective contractors
and subcontractors to certify that they are not engaging in a variety of human
trafficking activities in supplying end products, and it requires changes in
contractual clauses and compliance programs as well as cooperation with audits
and investigations. See Exec. Order No. 13627, 77 Fed. Reg. 60029 (Sept. 25,
2012) in effect March 2, 2015, https://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/
executive-order-strengthening-protections-against-trafficking-persons-fe.
Executive Order 13126 has prohibited the use of products made with the use of
forced or child labor since 1999. Exec. Order 1999 No. 13126, "Prohibition of
Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor" (June 12,
1999), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1999-06-16/pdfl99-15491.pdf. The Defense
Department already requires some assessment of measures to preempt or prevent
human rights issues for security contractors. See DFAR 252.225-7039.
143. Fact Sheet: Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements,
HUMANRIGHTS.GOV (June 19, 2013), http://www.humanrights.gov/fact-sheet-
burma-responsible-investment-reporting-requirements.html [hereinafter Burma
Fact Sheet].
144. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78o-6(a)
(2012).
145. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 1502(e)(1). The term "adjoining country" is defined as a country that shares an
internationally recognized border with the DRC, which presently includes Angola,
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ensure that TNCs do not source tin, tantalum, tungsten, or gold
("3TG") from mines controlled by rebels who commit rape and torture,
use child soldiers, and exploit child labor-activities which, among
others, have led to a human rights crisis affecting millions of
Congolese. "' The minerals are exceedingly common in everyday
use-cell phones, computers, surgical implants, cameras, diapers,
wind turbines, coatings for food cans, solders, catalysts, stabilizers,
light bulbs, aerospace components, machine tools, electronic
conductors, jewelry, medical equipment, and anti-lock brakes all have
the potential to contain "conflict minerals.""'
Congo has been called the "rape capital of the world," and
many public campaigns have used that rhetoric to convince
consumers and investors to scrutinize companies that NGOs believe
have not adequately cleaned up their supply chains."' The law does
not prohibit the use of conflict minerals, but instead requires certain
companies to: obtain an independent private sector third-party audit
of its report of the facilities used to process the conflict minerals;
conduct a reasonable country of origin inquiry; and describe the steps
the company used to mitigate the risk, in order to improve its due
diligence process. 14 A portion of the law requiring companies to
disclose whether their products are "DRC-conflict free" was ruled
unconstitutional by a federal appeals court on August 18, 2015, on
Burundi, Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. See id.
146. For a detailed description of the history of the Congo and the Congolese
wars, see JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE
COLLAPSE OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA (reprint ed., Public
Affairs 2011).
147. See Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, at 39, 77 Fed.
Reg. 56,274, 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240, 249(b)),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf; Supplier Responsibility, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdflApple-SR_2012_Progress-
Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2015); Brief of Experts on the Democratic Republic
of the Congo as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., et al., v.
S.E.C., No. 13-5252 (Jan 23, 2013).
148. See, e.g., UN Official Calls DR Congo 'Rape Capital of the World', BBC
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/8650112.stm (quoting Margot
Wallstrom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in
Conflict). For an example of a publicity campaign, see John Prendergast, Can You
Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence
in the World, ENOUGHPROJECT (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/
publications/can-you-hear-congo-now-cell-phones-conflict-minerals-and-worst-
sexual-violence-world.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p).
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First Amendment constitutional grounds."'0 This effectively gutted
the "name and shame" portion of the law. The law remains intact
until the decision becomes final, however."' Firms face liability for
making false or misleading statements under Section 18 of the
Exchange Act because these reports are filed with the SEC. 152
Although early reports estimated that the law would affect over 6,000
firms' 3 as of the deadline for 2014, in the first year, only 1,315
companies had filed reports. 15 4 For the 2015 filings reflecting the 2014
season, slightly fewer companies filed reports, but early indications
reveal that they are somewhat more detailed than the filings for
2013. 155
I, along with others, have criticized the law for
oversimplifying the deadly crisis in Congo, and reducing it to easily-
digestible sound bites about rebels, rape, and cell phones.' 6 While
150. Nat'1 Ass'n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., No. 13-5252, 2015 WL 5089667 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 18, 2015).
151. See, e.g., Keith F. Higgins, Director, SEC Division of Corporation
Finance, Public Statement, Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of
Appeals Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541681994.
152. Id.
153. See KPMG, CONFLICT MINERALS AND BEYOND: PART TWO: A
MORE TRANSPARENT SUPPLY CHAIN 1 (2012), http://www.kpmg.com/Globallen/
IssuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPublications/conflict-minerals/Documents/conflict-
minerals-beyond-part-two.pdf. Companies that are not affected either meet the
exemptions or do not come under the law's requirements. However, because the
law did not allow for a de minimis exception for some of the metals, many
companies are affected.
154. EY CENTER FOR BOARD MATTERS, LET'S TALK: GOVERNANCE: FIRST YEAR
CONFLICT MINERAL REPORTING REVEALS INSIGHTS AND SURPRISES 2 (2014),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-lets-talk-governance-june-
2014/$FILE/EY-lets-talk-governance-june-2014.pdf. Many filers claimed that they
could not adequately trace their supply chains in part because their suppliers did
not respond to survey requests. See, e.g., Conflict Minerals Report (Form
SD), APPLE INC. (May 29, 2014), http://investor.apple.com/secfiling.cfm?
filingid=1193125-14-217311&cik= (asserting continuing efforts to push suppliers
to provide information).
155. Cydney Posner, This Year's Conflict Minerals Findings Show Some
Improvement, According To Early Review, PUBCO @ COOLEY (June 20, 2015),
http://cooleypubco.com/2015/06/20/this-years-conflict-minerals-filings-shows-some-
improvement-according-to-early-review.
156. See Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and
Shaming Corporations Through the Dodd-Frank Act's Corporate Governance
Disclosure Won't Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351 (2013);
Brief of Amicus Curiae Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
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some have labeled the disclosure law a success, others have claimed
that it has done little to stem the violence in Congo and has in fact
hurt exports in other countries.' Scholar Jeff Schwartz remains
hopeful that, with amendments, the law can be effective, but, based
on his empirical study of the first set of filings, observed:
Naming and shaming requires that activist
consumers and shareholders be able to distinguish
between good actors and bad, so that they can take
action against the latter. But the information in the
reports does not provide sufficient information to get
such campaigns off the ground. The filings lack the
type of specifics that could inspire investors to
reallocate their money or consumers to reassess their
purchasing habits. Almost every company fell into the
category of having a reason to believe they were
sourcing from a country in the Congo region, but
being unable to tell whether their minerals were
really from there, or despite being from there, were
actually conflict free. Disclosures such as these
provide paltry basis for change.'1 8
Given that the proponents of the legislation had hoped that
naming and shaming through transparency would lead investors and
consumers to take action against noncompliant companies,"5 this law
does not appear, at present, to have had the desired effect. The law,
which may serve as a model for others, is a poor example of the use of
disclosure legislation. Although some large companies, such as Apple
Support of Petitioners, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C. (D.C. Cir. 2014), No. 13-5252;
S6verine Autesserre, Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and
Their Unintended Consequences, 111 AFRICAN TALES 202, 212-13 (2012).
157. Compare Fidel Bafilemba, et al., The Impact of Dodd-Frank and Conflict
Minerals Reforms on Eastern Congo's Conflict, THE ENOUGH PROJECT
(June 10, 2014), http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/impact-dodd-frank-and-
conflict-minerals-reforms-eastern-congo%E2%80%99s-war (claiming that the law
has made mining many minerals less economically viable for armed groups), with
Sarah von Billerbeck, Is the News about Congo's Conflict Minerals Good?, WASH.
POST (June 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/
wp/2014/06/18/is-the-news-about-congos-conflict-minerals-good (arguing armed
groups have simply found ways around the law).
158. Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 32).
159. David Sullivan, A Step Forward on Conflict Minerals via Financial
Reform, THE ENOUGH PROJECT (May 20, 2010), http://www.enoughproject.org/
blogs/step-forward-conflict-minerals-financial-reform.
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and Intel, have made commendable strides in tracing minerals,"o for
most companies, it is expensive and onerous, and has done nothing to
stop sexual and gender-based violence and mass killings.
2. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act
In 2010, the California legislature passed the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act ("CTSCA" or the "Act"), designed
to end the practices of human trafficking and forced labor. 61 The law
does not prohibit the sale of goods produced through the use of forced
labor, but rather attempts to change company practices through
public disclosures, designed to promote socially conscious consumer
purchasing decisions. 162 The CTSCA requires retailers and
manufacturers earning over $100 million in worldwide receipts, and
doing business in the State of California (as defined by California tax
rules), to disclose efforts to ensure their supply chains are free from
slavery and human trafficking. 163 These disclosures must be
presented in an easily-identified and prominent link on their
website. 164 Approximately 3,200 companies are subject to these
disclosure regulations. '6
The CTSCA requires corporations to include the following
information in their disclosures: verification of supply chains to
evaluate risks of human trafficking; audits of suppliers to evaluate
supplier compliance with company standards for trafficking and
slavery; certification from direct suppliers that materials in the
product comply with anti-slavery and anti-trafficking laws;
160. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple Claims Progress on Conflict Minerals,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/02/11/apple-claims-
progress-on-conflict-minerals/ (detailing Apple's progress in eliminating conflict
mining from its supply chain); Lynnley Browning, Where Apple Gets the Tantalum
for Your iPhone, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/02/13/
where-apple-gets-tantalum-your-iphone-304351.html (describing how Apple went
beyond the legal minimum reporting requirements); Hayes Brown, Intel
Announces First 'Conflict-Free' Microprocessor, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://thinkprogress.org/security/2014/01/07/3126271/intel-announces-launch-
conflict-free-microprocessors/.
161. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012).
162. Alexandra Prokopets, Note, Trafficking in Information: Evaluating the
Efficacy of the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, 37
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 351, 354-55 (2014).
163. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2014).
164. Id. at § 1714.43(b).
165. John Pickles & Shengiun Zhu, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN
SUPPLY CHAINS ACT 3 (Capturing the Gains, Working Paper No. 2013/15, 2013).
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maintenance of internal standards and policies for employees or
contractors who fail to meet company standards; and training on
trafficking and slavery for employees and management. 166
Specifically, companies must outline their "efforts to eradicate slavery
and human trafficking from [their] direct supply chain for tangible
goods offered for sale."l67
Early disclosures indicated that the CTSCA may have limited
success in promoting changes in corporate behavior, although some
stakeholders are tracking them.'6 8 The Act initially had two main
problems. First, it did not specify any uniform standards for
disclosure. 169 Critics contended that the information may be
presented in a manner that is unintelligible to the average consumer,
does not impact their daily lives, and is often misleading. 170
Companies' disclosures vary widely in the usefulness and specificity
of the information disclosed. Many companies have complied, posting
statements detailing the efforts they are making to investigate and
end the use of human trafficking within their supply chains. 17
Others, however, have complied with the Act by disclosing their
intent not to take any action to end the abuse within their
organization. 172 These disclosures are in full compliance with the
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c) (2014).
167. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (2014).
168. See SB 657 Disclosure Search, KNOW THE CHAIN,
https://www.knowthechain.org/sb657-search/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Terry
Fitzpatrick, Slavery in Your Shopping Cart? New Website Helps You Know!, FREE
THE SLAVES BLOG (Oct. 21, 2013), http://freetheslaves.net/slavery-in-your-
shopping-cart-new-website-helps-you-know/.
169. Prokopets, supra note 162, at 363.
170. Sophia Eckert, Note, The Business Transparency on Trafficking and
Slavery Act: Fighting Forced Labor in Complex Global Supply Chains, 12 J. INT'L
Bus. & L. 383, 399-400 (2013).
171. See, e.g., Supplier Responsibility, APPLE INC., http://www.apple.com/
supplier-responsibility/ (last visited May 25, 2014) (including a full progress
report and detailed information about suppliers' requirements and workers'
rights); California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, BAYER CORPORATION,
http://www.bayerus.com/disclosure.aspx (last visited May 25, 2014) (detailing two
initiatives implemented to improve supply chain standards and corporate
sustainability as well as various other actions).
172. 10 Firms Decline to Take Action on Trafficking Risks Under California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE
CENTRE, http://business-humanrights.org/en/10-firms-decline-to-take-action-on-
trafficking-risks-under-california-transparency-in-supply-chains-act (last visited
Aug. 5, 2015) (identifying the following ten firms as declining to take any
affirmative steps: Caterpillar, Commercial Metals, Danaher Corp., Hyundai
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standards set out in the CTSCA and are therefore legally acceptable,
but in my view, still constitute a violation of the social contract
between the corporation and society.
Second, the Act fails to incorporate an effective enforcement
mechanism. The only method of enforcing the provision is through an
injunctive action brought by the Attorney General, although a
putative class action was filed in August 2015, based in part on a
corporation's representations on its website.1 73 Perhaps in response to
these criticisms, the Attorney General, Kamala D. Harris, published
a resource guide for compliance with model disclosure language in
2015,174 and in April 2015, began sending letters to companies, asking
them to prove compliance or explain why they believe that they are
not subject to the law.'7 As of the time of this writing, research has
not revealed whether any government enforcement actions have
resulted from the April 2015 letters. Further, as I will discuss in Part
IV, these disclosures may not have the effect on either consumers or
companies that the state legislature intended.
Motor America, IDEX Corp., Johnson Matthey, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts,
Manufactured Packaging Products, Overhill Farms, and Valero Energy).
173. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(d) (2014). Monica Sud, a California woman,
filed suit against Costco Wholesale Corp. (also named as defendants are CP Food
Products Inc., the U.S. distributor of the prawns, and Charoen Pokphand Foods
PCL, the company's Thailand-based parent company) for its purchase and sale of
Thailand's farmed prawns. Her complaint alleges the prawns are caught by
forced, unpaid labor. Citing the CTSCA and state laws that bar companies from
making false claims as to illegal conduct in their supply chain, the lawsuit seeks
an injunction barring Costco from selling products that have been produced with
slave labor and requiring it to disclose any such products. In July, the U.S. State
Department's annual report (examining human trafficking in 188 countries)
expressed concern about Thailand's fishing industry. See Erik Larson, Costco
Sued Over Claims Shrimp Harvested With Slave Labor, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-19/costco-sued-
over-claims-shrimp-is-harvested-with-slave-labor; Complaint, Sud v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., No. 3:15-cv-03783 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015).
174. CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY
CHAINS ACT, A RESOURCE GUIDE (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/knowthechain/
resources/resource-guide.pdf.
175. Attorney General Issues Guide for Complying With Transparency in
Supply Chains Act, CALCHAMBER ADVOCACY, http://calchamber.com/
governmentrelations/businessissues/pages/california-transparency-in-supply-
chains-act.aspx (last visited Aug. 4, 2015).
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3. The Responsible Investment in Burma Act
Under federal law, companies with over $500,000 in new
investments in Burma must now provide an overview of operations
and disclose their policies, due diligence, and mitigation measures
related to human rights, labor, anti-corruption, financial
transparency, the acquisition of property, arrangement with security
providers, and the environment."1 6 The law does not require firms to
establish policies to prevent human rights abuses; rather, it only
requires companies to disclose the information.'7 so that CSOs are
empowered "to take an active role in work[ing] with companies to
promote investments that will enhance broad-based development and
reinforce political and economic reform.""' The Burma law cites the
UNGPs as well as the OECD Guidelines. As of July 2015, a handful of
companies have reported compliance with the regulations."'
C. The EU Approach to Human Rights Disclosures
1. Conflict Minerals
The European Union, which performed an impact analysis on
conflict minerals,'s began addressing conflict minerals disclosure
differently than the United States, prompting harsh critique from
176. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2013/05/responsible-investment-reporting-requirements-final.pdf (last visited
Aug. 5, 2014). The company must submit a report within 180 days of reaching the
$500,000 investment threshold; after the initial report, the company must file an
annual report every year on July 1.
177. Amy K. Lehr, Burma (Myanmar) Sanctions Eased, But Companies
Required to Report on Responsible Business Practices, FOLEY HOAG LLP
(July 11, 2012), http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2012/07/11/burma-myanmar-
sanctions-eased-but-companies-required-to-report-on-responsible-business-
practices/.
178. Burna Fact Sheet, supra note 143.
179. Among the reporting companies are: Hercules Offshore, Inc., Aberdeen
Asset Management Inc., Western Union, Capital Group Companies, Coca-Cola,
Four Rivers, Clipper Holdings, Inc., TPG Holdings, Gap Inc., and Tillman Global
Holdings, LLC. See Doing Business in Burma, Reporting Requirements, EMBASSY
OF THE U.S. RANGOON BURMA, http://burma.usembassy.gov/reporting-
requirements.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
180. Frequently Asked Questions-Responsible Sourcing of Minerals
Originating Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Towards an Integrated EU
Approach, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Mar. 5, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release MEMO-14-157_en.htm.
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NGOs.s1 ' The initial proposed EU regulation cited the UNGPs and
established a voluntary process through which importers of 3TG into
the EU self-certify that they do not contribute to financing in
"conflict-affected" or "high risk areas." 182 Unlike Dodd-Frank, both
the initial and the new European Parliament proposals cover all of
the conflict areas of the world, specifically areas "in a state of armed
conflict, with presence of widespread violence, collapse of civil
infrastructure, fragile post-conflict areas as well as areas of weak or
non-existent governance and security, such as failed states,
characterized by widespread and systematic violations of human
rights, as established under international law.""'
On February 19, 2014, the European Parliament's
development committee voted in favor of an EU regulation that
required companies using and trading minerals, and all upstream
and downstream companies, to adhere to a legally binding obligation
to undertake supply chain due diligence in identifying and mitigating
the risk of conflict financing and human rights abuse. 1 4 Among other
things, the report acknowledged that, "in order to increase efficiency
and achieve equity in the field of CSR, a move away from the current
'A la carte' system, in which companies choose codes and standards
according to their own preferences, towards common industry-wide
standards is of primary importance."8 s NGOs strongly welcomed the
European Parliament's call for regulation that enforces existing
181. See Proposed EU Regulation on Conflict Minerals: Commentaries &
Media Coverage, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, http://business-
humanrights.org/en/conflict-peace/conflict-minerals/proposed-eu-regulation-on-
conflict-minerals-commentaries-media-coverage, (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); Ian
Weekes, Conflict Minerals: New EU Rules Simpler Alternative to US Regulation,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/blogleu-regulations-conflict-minerals-trade.
182. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Mar. 5, 2014), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/
march/tradoc_152227.pdf.
183. Union system for self-certification of importers of certain minerals
originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas ***I, Eur. Parl. Doc. P8_TA-
PROV(2015)0204 (2015).
184. Mayer Brown LLP, Proposed European Law Against Conflict Minerals,
LEXOLOGY.COM (July 2, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=cle00c92-83e7-4738-b642-db7f324ec3e5.
185. Judith Sargentini, Report on Promoting Development Through
Responsible Business Practices, Including the Role of Extractive Industries in
Developing Countries, EURO. PARL. COMM. ON DEV., Doc. No. A7-0132/2014, at 5
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2014-0132+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN.
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international standards and makes supply chain checks compulsory
for companies operating in Europe.' 86 However, this proposal was
initially rejected.'
Taking note of various stakeholder consultations and the U.S.
Dodd-Frank law, the EU first limited the scope of the disclosures to
importers, and chose a voluntary mechanism to avoid any regional
boycotts that hurt locals and did not stop armed conflict.' 8 Those
importers, out of the roughly 400 affected, who chose to certify had to
conduct due diligence in accordance with the OECD Guidance8 9 and
report their findings to the EU. The EU would then publish a list of
"responsible smelters and refiners" so that the public would hold
importers and smelters accountable for conducting appropriate due
diligence. The proposed initial regulation also offered incentives, such
as assistance with procurement contracts.9 o However, some NGOs
raised concerns that dozens of minerals in over seventeen countries
around the world may fuel conflict, that targeting importers would
leave a large loophole, and that the proposal contradicted the spirit of
the UNGPs."'
Supporters of mandatory disclosure argue that, because the
EU is the world's largest trading bloc and a major importer of
products containing natural resources, "anything short of a
mandatory and binding obligation on businesses would mean that the
Commission had failed to do enough to prevent Europe from acting as
a 'conflict mineral-trading hub.""9 2
186. Id.
187. Alexandria Bennett, Too Weak to Work? EU's Conflict
Minerals Regulation, SOURCEINTELLIGENCE.COM (May 8, 2015),
http://www.sourceintelligence.comL/eu-conflict-minerals-will-it-work/.
188. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council,
supra note 182.
189. OECD, OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY
CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS: SECOND
EDITION (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264185050-en.
190. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council,
supra note 182.
191. See, e.g., EC's Conflict Minerals Proposal Must Not Be Limited to Four
Minerals, CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
(Feb. 5, 2015), http://somo.nl/news-en/ec20l9s-conflict-minerals-proposal-must-
not-be-limited-to-four-minerals.
192. Commission Should Heed Parliament's Call for Strong EU Regulation on
Conflict Resources, Campaigners Say, GLOBALWITNESS.ORG (Feb. 27 2014),
https://www.globalwitness.org/archive/eu-commission-should-heed-parliaments-
call-strong-eu-regulation-conflict-resources/.
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In May 2015, Parliament rejected the voluntary disclosure
scheme, and required that the legislation be mandatory, and that it
apply to importers of manufactured products containing tin,
tungsten, tantalum, and gold from conflict areas, as well as to
importers of raw products.1 9 3 The proposed certification procedure
will follow the previous proposal in using OECD certification
guidelines. 1 Member states will review, and must eventually
approve, the proposals, and then the Parliament, the Council, and the
Commission will engage in negotiations regarding these proposals.'
The U.S. and the EU have developed well-intentioned, but
likely counterproductive, regulations concerning conflict minerals.
The U.S. law, Dodd-Frank, goes too far and too deep in the supply
chain, without any evidence that it will help the intended
beneficiaries of the law, the Congolese. The law is too narrow in
geographic scope and in the scope of minerals covered. Further, the
law may cause some manufacturers to boycott certain countries in
order to avoid the burden of disclosure. 96 The EU proposal, like
Dodd-Frank, forces legislators to accomplish the impossible task of
defining a "conflict" zone. Moreover, the EU law is costly, because it
will require hundreds of thousands of European companies to gather
data, make inquiries, and review and analyze the responses of
suppliers. Most importantly, there is no evidence that the type of
disclosures required by Dodd-Frank and the EU proposal are effective
in changing companies' behavior and protecting human rights.
193. Dynda Thomas, Conflict Minerals-Light at the End of the Tunnel?, AFR.
L. BuS. (July 14, 2015), http://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/5682-conflict-
minerals-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel.
194. Proposed European Law Against Conflict Minerals, LEXOLOGY.COM
(July 2, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/1ibrary/detail.aspx?g=cleOOc92-83e7-
4738-b642-db7f324ec3e5 (stating that the guidelines require that companies: first,
establish strong company management systems; second, identify and assess risk
in the supply chain; third, design and implement a strategy to respond to
identified risks; fourth, carry out independent third-party audits of the supply
chain due diligence at identified points in the supply chain; and fifth, report on
supply chain due diligence).
195. Id.
196. See Narine, supra note 156, at 351-401; Brief of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo as Amid Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nat'l
Ass'n of Mfrs., et al., v. S.E.C., No. 13-5252 (Jan 23, 2013).
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2. EU Non-Financial Disclosure Rules
On April 15, 2014, the EU Parliament adopted a non-financial
disclosure directive that is expected to affect 6,000 companies with
500 or more employees beginning in 2017.117 The directive' requires
affected companies to disclose policies, risks, and outcomes related to
environmental matters, social and employee-related issues, human
rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and board diversity.' 99
Companies may report based upon a number of frameworks,
including the UN Global Compact, the UNGPs, the OECD
Guidelines, their home countries' sustainability requirements,200 or
ISO 26000.201 Enforcement takes a "comply or explain" approach.
Those who choose not to report will be required to explain why they
did not do so. 202 As discussed elsewhere in this Article, a disclosure
requirement with no significant penalties that depends on investors
and consumers to read, comprehend, and act will not likely have the
meaningful impact that drafters intend. While transparency is
important and can be useful, human rights crises cannot be solved
merely through a corporate disclosure report.
197. Council Directive 2014/95, Art. 50(1), 2014 O.J. (L330) 1, 4-5 (EU).
198. An EU directive is a goal that the member States of the European Union
must achieve through law that the member state chooses to enact to accomplish
that goal by a certain date. An EU regulation is binding law on every EU state as
soon as it is passed. National governments do not need to enact implementing
legislation for it to take effect. Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts, EUROPEAN
UNION, http://europa.euleu-law/decision-making/legal-acts/index-en.htm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2015).
199. Non-Financial Reporting, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://ec.europa.eulfinance/company-reporting/non-
financial-reporting/indexen.htm.
200. For a list of country-specific sustainability requirements as of 2013, see
Narine, supra note 23.
201. See Int'l Org. for Standardization (ISO), ISO 26000: Social
Responsibility, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/
iso26000.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) (discussing the standards and guidance
on how businesses and organizations can operate responsibly). ISO is the world's
largest voluntary organization for setting international standards by global
consensus. About ISO, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
202. ISO 26000: Social Responsibility, supra note 201; The New EU
Accounting Directive and (Non-) Financial Reporting Obligations,
McGUIREWOODS LLP (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-
Resources/Alerts/2015/2/New-EU-Accounting-Directive.aspx.
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D. Other Proposed Sources of Obligations: Maloney Human
Trafficking Bill203
On June 11, 2014, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney
introduced the Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking
and Slavery Act of 2014 in the United States House of
Representatives. 204 This bill would impose mandatory disclosures to
the SEC on every company with over $100 million in worldwide
receipts, similarly to the CTSCA. 205 The disclosures must state the
extent to which the company has: created and enforced policies to
identify and eliminate the risks of human trafficking within the
supply chain; implemented a policy preventing employees from
engaging in commercial sex acts with a minor; made efforts to
evaluate the risks of human trafficking within its supply chain;
attempted to audit the members of the supply chain to ensure that
working conditions and policies are in compliance with corporate anti-
trafficking policies; trained employees and maintained internal
accountability standards; and provided adequate remedies to any
trafficking victims identified within the company's supply chain.206
The Maloney bill does not require companies to enact policies to
prevent the use of forced labor, but rather requires them to disclose
what, if any, steps they are taking to avoid using forced labor, thereby
purportedly empowering consumers to make responsible decisions.207
Like the CTSCA, the Maloney bill requires each company to
post their disclosure statements on their websites, or to respond to
consumer inquiries in writing within thirty days if the company does
not have a website.208 The Department of Labor will create a list of
companies subject to the legislation and a summary of the disclosures
received, both of which will be posted on the Department's website for
easy consumer access.20" The bill also requires the "Secretary of
203. This bill should not be confused with the Justice for Victims of
Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22 (2015), which passed both houses of
Congress and was signed into law in May 2015.
204. H.R. 4842, 113th Cong. (2014).
205. Maloney Targets Slavery, Human Trafficking, and Child Labor with
Bipartisan Supply Chain Transparency Bill, CONGRESSWOMAN CAROLYN B.
MALONEY (June 12, 2014), http://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/maloney-targets-slavery-human-trafficking-and-child-labor-with.
206. H.R. 4842, 113th Cong. (2014).
207. Maloney Targets Slavery, Human Trafficking, and Child Labor, supra
note 205.
208. H.R. 4842, 113th Cong. (2014).
209. Id.
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Labor, in consultation with the Secretary of State and other
appropriate Federal and international agencies, independent labor
evaluators, and human rights groups, to develop an annual list of the
top 100 companies complying with supply chain labor standards," to
be posted on the Department of Labor's website. 0 Of course, for the
law to be effective, consumers must seek out and use this
information. The bill has received significant support from SRIs. 11
This bill is modeled after a previous version, introduced in
2011. 212 The original Maloney bill contained many of the same
provisions, and the language in the 2014 bill is nearly identical to the
original in all provisions that remained consistent. The main
difference between the two versions is the 2014 bill's requirement
that disclosures be posted on the Department of Labor's website. The
2011 bill faced severe criticism from businesses, as well as from
several state trade groups, such as the California Chamber of
Commerce, which found the bill to be too punitive. 2 13 The 2014 bill
will likely face similar barriers to passage.
IV. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Disclosure requirements are largely aimed at the marketplace
of consumers and investors. Some consumers make conscious choices
based upon their ethical beliefs and mobilize others to do the same,
often by publicizing corporate wrongdoing. Indeed, this strategy was
a catalyst to the divestment movement, which eventually contributed
to the end of apartheid in South Africa.214 In this Article, I explore
210. Maloney Targets Slavery, Human Trafficking, and Child Labor, supra
note 205; H.R. 4842, 113th Cong. (2014).
211. A coalition of 300 SRIs has formed to support the passage of this bill. See
Julie Wokaty, Investors Welcome Federal Bill Calling for Corporate Disclosures on
Trafficking and Slavery Risks, INTERFAITH CENTER ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY BLOG (June 12, 2014), http://www.iccr.org/investors-welcome-
federal-bill-calling-corporate-disclosures-trafficking-and-slavery-risks.
212. H.R. 2759, 112th Cong. (2011).
213. See Patrick Wall, In Congress, a Bid to Make U.S. Firms Take Steps
Against Modern-Day Slavery, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 5, 2011),
http://csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0805/In-Congress-a-bid-to-make-US-firms-
take-steps-against-modern-day-slavery.
214. See A Struggle From the Ground Up: The Anti-Apartheid Movement in
South Africa, TAVAANA, https://tavaana.org/en/content/struggle-ground-anti-
apartheid-movement-south-africa (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) (explaining that
"the consumer boycott was a particularly effective tactic; by decimating profits, it
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how most consumers, armed with all of these disclosures, respond to
company disclosures. When enacting disclosure regulations,
legislators assume that consumers will read and digest the
disclosures, and then make decisions based upon those disclosures.
However, the evidence does not always substantiate these
assumptions. Instead, disclosures often confuse consumers rather
than raising their consciousness. Even when consumers are informed
and aware of companies' business practices, their purchase habits do
not always align with their ethical ideals.
Accordingly, I propose that governments abandon disclosure
requirements, because they rarely create informed consumers, and
even when consumers are informed, they do not often act in response
to these disclosures. Therefore, in order to further human rights,
lawmakers should focus on regulations other than disclosure
requirements.
A. The Confused Consumer
The first problem with the disclosure regime is that
consumers do not always read or understand disclosures. 215
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider have focused on the easy trap
into which legislators fall, in which legislators pass generally
uncontroversial disclosure rules to aid consumers in their everyday
decision-making processes related to health, mortgages, online
internet purchases, terms of use, and privacy policies, to name a
few.216 The authors conclude that, while lawmakers use disclosure to
meet regulatory goals, the average consumer is not educated enough
to understand the disclosures, will not read the disclosures because
there are too many, and may not know what to do with the
information even if they do read and understand it.217 To further this
drove a wedge between business and government as white store owners put
pressure on the government to change policy").
215. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts,
43(1) J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2014); see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More
Than You Wanted to Know About the Failures of Disclosure 1 (N.Y Univ. Law and
Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 395, 2012) (observing that "[t]he theorist's hope
is that disclosure regulation forces sellers to compete on the information disclosed
and thus represents a superior alternative to measures that might distort
markets or reduce choice. The realist's concern, however, is that disclosure does
not work so well.").
216. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1.
217. Id. at 42.
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claim, the authors cite a study indicating that over forty million
Americans are functionally illiterate, and that another fifty million
are marginally literate."'
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider also conclude that the
solution is not tweaking the implementation of disclosure
requirements, but rather using tools besides disclosure for certain
information. 219 Assuming that perfecting the implementation of
disclosure requirements will result in more effective disclosures will
only lead to more amendments to disclosure requirements,220 because
lawmakers who feel that consumers need to be informed will add
more, not less, information-and this information is notoriously
difficult to simplify. 221 Consumers may become numb even to
simplified disclosures and are increasingly willing to buy cheap
products manufactured in conditions that would not pass muster in
their home countries. Consumers find it easy to rationalize choices
that do not comport with the ideal of ethical sourcing, because they
are separated from the harm. Instead of disclosure requirements,
Ben-Shahar and Schneider recommend tougher regulation of
companies when warranted.2 22 I agree with this recommendation and
contend that, if legislators really want to curb bad behavior, they
should impose financial penalties, criminal sanctions, and debarment
from government contracts. If the human rights situation in a host
country is egregious enough, the U.S. government should ban
companies from conducting business there through an embargo.
This argument for tougher regulation applies with particular
force to the human rights context. The CTSCA, the proposed Maloney
bill, and the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals legislation simply require
due diligence and disclosure. 2 23 They do not, however, punish activity
that harms the purported beneficiaries of these laws-the affected
communities. Instead, governments expect the marketplace to punish
the bad actors. As I discuss below, this does not happen with enough
regularity to be an effective strategy.
218. Id. at 8.
219. See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at Part III
(suggesting that the problems inherent in disclosure require a solution outside of
the disclosure model).
220. See id. at 138-40 (suggesting that lawmakers routinely impose and
extend disclosures out of the mistaken belief that more information leads to better
decision-making).
221. Id. at 26-27.
222. Id. at 183.
223. See supra Part III.B, D.
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B. The Conscious Consumer
Assuming for the sake of argument that consumers read,
understand, and want to apply the data that has been disclosed to
them, consumers can play an important role in motivating companies
to be more socially and environmentally responsible.22 4 Consumers
are becoming more aware of ethical consumption through marketing
and information campaigns. 2 25 The literature suggests that many
consumers shop with their morals as well as with their wallets.22 6
Studies have sought to establish concrete, empirical evidence about
what motivates a consumer to support or boycott a company based on
its CSR record.22 7 A recent survey used to support the new UK
Modern Slavery Act228 (which is similar to the CTSCA) indicates that
two-thirds of UK consumers would stop buying a product if they
found out that slaves were involved in the manufacturing process,
and that consumers would be willing to pay up to ten percent more
224. See Sergio W. Carvalho, et al., Consumer Reactions to CSR: A Brazilian
Perspective, 91(2) J. BUS. ETHICS 291, 291 (2010) ("In fact, a recent McKinsey poll
(2007) reveals that CEOs of companies that have signed the UN Global Compact
expect consumers to have the greatest impact on the way companies manage
societal expectations in the next 5 years.").
225. Oliver M. Freestone & Peter J. McGoldrick, Motivations by the Ethical
Consumer, 79(4) J. Bus. ETHICS 445, 445 (2008).
226. Id.; see also Silvia Grappi, Simona Romani, & Richard P. Bagozzi,
Consumer Response to Corporate Irresponsible Behavior: Moral Emotions and
Virtues, 66 J. BUS. RESEARCH 1814, 1814 (2013); Rommel 0. Salvador, Altaf
Merchant, & Elizabeth A. Alexander, Faith and Fair Trade: The Moderating Role
of Contextual Religious Salience, 121 J. BUs. ETHICS 353, 355 (2014) (explaining
that a person's values are likely to play a role in shaping purchasing decisions);
Adam Corner, Morality Is Missing From Our Debate About Sustainable Behavior,
THE GUARDIAN (July 19, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/social-justice-behaviour-climate-change.
227. Freestone & McGoldrick, supra note 225, at 446. See also Thuriane
Mahe, Are Stated Preferences Confirmed by Purchasing Behaviors? The Case of
Fair Trade-Certified Bananas in Switzerland, 92 J. Bus. ETHICS 301, 311 (2010)
(finding that Swedish persons would pay more for bananas certified Fair Trade).
Some studies say consumers are willing to pay more for ethically labeled goods,
while others suggest they are not. But see Verena Gruber, How Techniques of
Neutralization Legitimize Norm- and Attitude-Inconsistent Consumer Behavior,
121 J. BUS. ETHICS 29, 42 (2014) (finding that people behaved inconsistently
regarding their stated moral preference for sustainability when faced with higher
prices).
228. Modern Slavery Act, 2015, c. 30 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2015/30/pdfs/ukpga_20150030_en.pdf.
132 [47.1:1
Disclosing Disclosure's Defects
for slave-free products. 2 29 The survey also found that seventy percent
of luxury brand consumers and sixty percent of those who buy low-
and mid-range products would be willing to pay more, or even switch
brands, if they knew that exploited labor was involved in the supply
chain. 230 The numbers are similar, but slightly lower, for those
surveyed in the United States. 231 A study about the habits of
American consumers found:
[Wihen asked if they would be willing to pay more for
their favourite products if this ensured they were
produced without the use of modern slavery: 52% of
American consumers said they would pay more to
ensure products were produced without modern
slavery; 27% were not sure; 21% said they would not
pay more.232
This means that at least twenty percent, and possibly almost
half, of informed consumers would not likely change their buying
habits.
Surveys also indicate that consumers care about a wide
variety of issues, from animal welfare to fair trade to labor standards,
which can complicate an ethical consumer's decision-making
process. 233 Moreover, not all consumers are the same; socially
responsible consumers view corporate responsibility differently than
traditional consumers do.23 4 Therefore, because consumer impact may
229. Kieran Guilbert, UK Shoppers Would Switch Brands, Pay More to Avoid
Use of Slaves-Poll-TRFN, REUTERS UK, (Mar. 11, 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2015/03/1 1/uk-slavery-poll-unitedkingdom-idUKKBNOM70002015031 1.
230. Id.; see also WALK FREE FOUNDATION, SLAVERY ALERT: CONSUMER
POLL, UNITED KJNGDOM 2 (2015), http://d3mj66ag90b5fy.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Consumer-Poll-UK.pdf.
231. WALK FREE FOUNDATION, SLAVERY ALERT: CONSUMER POLL, UNITED
STATES 2 (2015), http://d3mj66ag90b5fy.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/
03/Consumer-Poll-USA.pdf.
232. Id. at 6.
233. Freestone & McGoldrick, supra note 225, at 446.
234. See Sergio W. Carvalho, et al., supra note 224, at 293 (explaining that
consumer reactions are related to price fairness and feelings of personal
satisfaction). See also Sun Ya Bae, Understanding Ethical Consumers: Assessing
the Moderating Effects of Price Sensitivity, Materialism, Impulse Buying
Tendency, and Clothing Involvement (2012) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Colorado
State University) (on file with the Colorado State Library System),
http://digitool.library.colostate.edulexlibris/dtl/d3-1/apache-media/
L2V4bGlicmlzL2RObC9kM18xL2FwYWNoZV9tZWRpYS8xODY2NTY=.pdf
(examining consumers' personal attitudes toward altruism, ethical concerns, and
ethical obligation as predictors of attitudes toward social responsibility in the
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be difficult to quantify precisely, some argue that many companies
and academics alike may underestimate the influence that consumers
could have on corporate social responsibility and fair trade policies.235
I, on the other hand, argue for the opposite view. Scholars
tend to overstate the impact of consumer influence on corporate
action. Although many consumers claim to care about social
responsibility, their purchasing decisions do not always reflect that
concern.236 Sustainable products represent only a small part of overall
demand; thus, consumers' positive stance towards ethical purchasing
is not an adequate predictor of actual purchasing behavior.237 Some
studies suggest that sustainable principles are too abstract for the
average consumer, and can be pushed aside in favor of lower prices
and convenience. 238 Further, a consumer's age and lack of knowledge
about sustainable products also contributes to a low demand for such
products. 239 Additionally, even when consumers are presented with
information in the form of corporate social responsibility reports,
many do not know what to do with this information. Indeed, one
recent study showed that CSR websites did little to change people's
perceptions, because many of the CSR sites failed to nurture trust,
apparel and textiles industry and noting that "consumers' price sensitivity may
depend on the types of products (i.e., functional or hedonic) or consumption
situations (i.e., purchasing products alone or with others). Also, price-sensitive
consumers are careful and smart shoppers who maximize total utility and make
purchase decisions that fulfill the goal").
235. See Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Unmasking the Charade of the Global Supply
Contract: A Novel Theory of Corporate Liability in Human Trafficking and Forced
Labor Cases, 35 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 255, 320 (2013) ("The impact of the consumer on
corporate behavior cannot be underestimated.").
236. See Gruber, supra note 227, at 39 (explaining that the gap between
consumers saying one thing but doing another can be reconciled through
"neutralization techniques [that] are intended to transform norm-contradicting
into norm-conforming behavior"); see also Narine, supra note 156, at 351; but see
WALK FREE FOUNDATION, supra note 230 (noting that over fifty percent of the
U.S. consumers surveyed said they had stopped buying from a brand that did not
meet their ethical expectations).
237. Gruber, supra note 227, at 30.
238. Id.; see also Sergio W. Carvalho, et al., supra note 224, 293-94
(explaining that consumer "perception of price fairness" can influence purchasing
decisions); Gwang-Suk Kim, et al., A Cross-National Investigation on How Ethical
Consumers Build Loyalty Toward Fair Trade Brands, 96 J. BUS. ETHICS 589
(2010) (investigating how "ethical consumption values . . . Fair Trade product
beliefs . . . and Fair Trade corporate evaluation. . . determine Fair Trade brand
loyalty").
239. Gruber, supra note 227, at 35-39.
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and did not adequately convey the message that the company has a
"greater stake in society than to make an extra dollar."240 Consumers
are generally skeptical about whether companies practice ethically
responsible behavior; many consumers view a company's CSR as
merely a tool to boost its image.241
More importantly, disclosure regulations assume that,
because consumers say they care about ethical sourcing, they act that
way in practice. However, researchers discovered that, while
consumers generally denounce unacceptable labor practices, product
desirability outweighs ethical considerations at the time of
purchase. 242 The authors of The Myth of the Ethical Consumer
correctly point out that typical surveys on consumer demand for fair
trade or ethically-sourced coffee, chocolate, and other products rely on
self-reporting, in which respondents often overstate what they do or
plan to do. "' Their research found that respondents' words and
actions were inconsistent; that most consumers do not care enough
about CSR to pay a higher price; and that most people will not
sacrifice product function for ethics. 244 Other studies show that,
although consumers are less likely to ask for ethical information
initially, if they receive disclosures, they are more likely to use
them.24 5 However, due to the "CSR halo effect," consumers often make
assumptions about a company's CSR performance that are
unwarranted given the data presented. 24 6 Due to the halo effect,
240. CSR Websites 'Do Little' to Change Consumer Perception,
ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.environmentalleader.com/
2014/03/13/csr-websites-do-little-to-change-consumer-perception/.
241. Xinming Deng, Understanding Consumer's Responses to Enterprise's
Ethical Behaviors: An Investigation in China, 107 J. BUS. ETHICS 159, 162 (2012).
242. Neeru Paharia et al., Sweatshop Labor Is Wrong Unless the Shoes Are
Cute: Cognition Can Both Help and Hurt Moral Motivated Reasoning, 121 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 81 (2013) [hereinafter Paharia et al.,
Sweatshop Labor Is Wrong]; see also Neeru Paharia, The Psychology of Sweatshop
Labor, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/neeru-
paharia/the-psychology-of-sweatshb 3574717.html [hereinafter Paharia, The
Psychology of Sweatshop Labor] (explaining reasons why product desirability
outweighs ethical considerations).
243. Timothy Devinney et al., Values vs. Value: New Research Revealing a
Disparity Between What Shoppers Say and What They Do Debunks the Myth of the
Ethical Consumer, STRATEGY+BUSINESS (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.strategy-
business.com/article/1 1103.
244. Id.
245. Paharia et al., Sweatshop Labor Is Wrong, supra note 242.
246. N. Craig Smith et al., Consumer Perceptions of Corporate Social
Responsibility: The CSR Halo Effect (Fontainebleau: INSEAD, Paper No. 12,
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consumers often believe that a company that treats employees well,
for example, is also a good steward of the environment.
Another flaw with the disclosure regime is that name and
shame disclosures depend on consumers spreading the message about
a company's poor practices. Consumer word of mouth is a highly
effective means of sending messages on a sweeping scale, especially
in an age of social media.247 However, at least one critic of media
frenzy boycotting has asserted that "campaigning is about more than
just Twitter storms, change needs long-term commitment from
people." 24 Nonetheless, the disclosure devotees rely on the
assumption that the negative publicity stemming from such public
scrutiny cannot leave a company completely unscathed,249 and that
enough of it piled together, over time, could motivate companies to
strengthen their social responsibility policies.250
There is no doubt that boycotts can be a powerful motivator
for firms to change behavior, and the proponents of disclosure count
on consumers to take this action. But while boycotts can be
successful, most boycotts fail to have any noticeable impact on
companies, even though the negative media coverage that boycotts
generate often makes it harder for a company to control the messages
it sends out to the public and its consumers.2 5 ' In order for boycotts to
succeed, there must be widespread support2 52 and consumers must be
2010) (suggesting that consumers make inferences about company CSR
performance based on limited information, contingent on a number of factors).
247. See Grappi, supra note 226; see also Ethical Consumer List of Consumer
Boycotts, ETHICAL CONSUMER (Oct. 17, 2014), http://ethicalconsumer.org/
boycotts/boycottslist.aspx (providing a current list of consumer boycotts); Tansy
Hoskins, Can Consumer Boycotts Change the World?, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/consumer-
boycott-change-world (explaining how #dumpstoli, a Twitter campaign, instigated
the circulation of photographs depicting people pouring Stoli into gutters outside
New York bars, thus invoking an almost instant response from Stolichnaya and a
widespread discussion on the effectiveness of such boycotts).
248. Hoskins, supra note 247.
249. Id. For consumer boycotting to implement change, a well-chosen target is
the most important factor. Unlike governments, which are more difficult to
influence, companies make "softer targets" because of their "increasing use of
social media and consumer engagement." For example, the "#dumpstoli message
for businesses is that no brand is safe if they are viewed as being hypocritical." Id.
250. See id.
251. Daniel Diermeier, Why Do Company Boycotts Work?, HBR BLOG (Aug 6,
2012), http://blogs.hbr.org/2012/08/when-do-company-boycotts-work.
252. Id.
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passionate about the issue. But consumers are fickle,253 which further
undermines the "name and shame" premise.
Moreover, even when consumers have vocalized their passion,
it has not always translated to impacts on the bottom line. For
example, the CEO of Chick-Fil-A's vocal opposition to gay marriage
triggered a consumer boycott that opened up a platform for further
political and social goals, although it did little to hurt the company's
profits; in fact, proponents of the CEO's anti-gay views developed a
consumer campaign to counteract the boycott.254 In 2009, a consumer
activist group boycotted Whole Foods after its CEO criticized
Obama's healthcare plan.255 Conservatives and Tea Party supporters
responded by leading a campaign supporting Whole Foods. 256 That
fiscal year Whole Foods posted $1.83 billion in sales, up from $1.79
billion the year before.
On the other hand, research has shown that companies that
implement sustainable strategy throughout their supply chain see an
increase in financial gain, while those who do not usually experience
a decrease.258 But there is scant evidence of a causal correlation.
Furthermore, research has not revealed consistent evidence, or
anything other than anecdotes, of consumer complaints or threats of
boycott leading to significant policy changes by some of the TNCs
most often accused of human rights abuses.
Accordingly, I conclude that the evidence is inconsistent, at
best, about the effect of disclosures on consumer behavior. The
evidence is clear, however, about the lack of consumer enforcement of
the social contract through boycott or other sustained action. If
legislators expect consumers to act using the information from
disclosures, the evidence to date shows that such an assumption is
253. See id. For example, a boycott against Proctor and Gamble because their
moon-shaped logo was rumored to symbolize devil worship fell flat, likely because
consumers were not invested in the issue.
254. Id.
255. Eric Etheridge, Whole Foods Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug, 17, 2009),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/17/whole-foods-fight?_r=0.
256. Nationwide Tea Party Leaders Announce Tea Party Buycott to Support
Whole Foods This Tuesday, REUTERS, (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2009/08/28/idUS176016+28-Aug-2009+BW20090828.
257. Brian Gaar, Whole Foods Ends Toughest Year With Another Profit,
STATESMAN (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.statesman.cominews/business/whole-foods-
ends-toughest-year-with-another-profit/nRQ8z/.
258. CSR Websites 'Do Little' to Change Consumer Perception, supra note 240.
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misplaced. Unfortunately, investors are not much better at enforcing
the social contract based upon disclosure.
V. THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR
While consumers may have limited power or desire to affect
corporate decision-making, investors-particularly pension funds and
other institutional investors-may wield more clout. There are some
benefits to disclosure in terms of company performance. A recent
study of mandatory environmental, social, and governance ("ESG")
reporting in four countries found that firms improve the reliability of
their disclosures and tend to change other internal management
practices, such as reducing emissions and improving labor
practices.259 Competitors and others often disclose ESG information
too, even when they are not directly affected by mandatory
regulations. 260 Further, researchers have concluded that such
reporting enhances, rather than detracts from, the financial value of
the firms, because investors value transparency.26 1 All of this is good
for stakeholders, particularly investors. Critically, however,
researchers have not determined whether disclosure regulations have
increased stakeholder demand for information or regulation.262
Legislators assume that sophisticated investors take
advantage of disclosures to ascertain which stocks to buy and sell.
But even SEC Chair Mary Jo White has publicly and repeatedly
questioned the effectiveness of these disclosures on the investor class,
particularly those related to human rights. In a statement about the
Dodd-Frank conflict minerals rule, she asserted that "seeking to
improve safety in mines for workers or to end horrible human rights
atrocities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are compelling
objectives, which, as a citizen, I wholeheartedly share ... [blut, as the
Chair of the SEC, I must question, as a policy matter, using the
federal securities laws and the SEC's powers of mandatory disclosure
to accomplish these goals."263 She has also stated that she believes
259. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG & THE BOSTON COLLEGE CENTER FOR
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, supra note 127.
260. Ioannou & Serafeim, supra note 25.
261. Id. at 21.
262. Id. at 22.
263. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, SEC Speech at the Nat'l Ass'n of
Corporate Dirs. Leadership Conference in National Harbor, Md.: The Path
Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detaill
Speech/1370539878806#.VFrAzYt4pB8.
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that investors suffer from "disclosure overload."264 This substantiates
my earlier assertion that consumers either ignore or do not know
what to do with the disclosures they see.
A. U.S. Shareholder Proposals on Human Rights
Socially responsible investors in the United States generally
attempt to effectuate change through shareholder proposals. SEC
Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders with $2,000 in market value, or one
percent, of a company's outstanding stock for at least one year, to
submit a proposal to be included in the company's proxy for vote at
the annual meeting. 265 Pension funds and socially responsible
investors file over half of shareholder proposals. 266 The highly
influential 2013 Institutional Shareholder Services proxy guidelines
advise clients to consider voting their proxies on environmental,
social, and governance matters on a case-by-case basis, depending on
a number of factors. Those factors include the scope of the request;
the degree to which existing relevant policies and practices have been
disclosed; whether the firms existing policies comport with
internationally recognized standards; how the company and its
facilities are monitored; whether the company participates in fair
labor organizations or other internationally recognized initiatives;
whether the organization conducts business in high risks areas;
recent and significant fines, litigation or controversies related to
human rights involving the company or its suppliers; and whether
the company deviates from industry standards. 267
In 2014, fifteen human rights-related shareholder proposals
were put forth in proxies for publicly traded firms.268 Many of them
cited the UNGPs in an effort to convince companies to report on how
they were assessing human rights risks and impacts, and/or to ask for
264. Id.
265. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (CF) (July 13, 2001),
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslbl4.htm.
266. Heidi Welsh & Michael Passoff, Proxy Preview 2012, As You Sow 6
(2012), https://www.missioninvestors.org/system/files/tools/proxypreview-2012-
helping-shareholders-vote-their-values-heidi-welsh-and-michael-passoff-as-you-
sow-and-sustainable-investments-institute.pdf.
267. See generally INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2013 U.S. PROXY
VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES 65 (2013), http://www.issgovernance.com/files/
2013ISSUSSummaryGuidelinesl312013.pdf.
268. EY CENTER FOR BOARD MATTERS, LET'S TALK: GOVERNANCE 3
(Feb. 2014), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-An-early-look-at-
proxy-season-2014/$FILE/EY-An-early-look-at-proxy-season-2014.pdf.
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audited sustainability reports from third-party suppliers regarding
labor practices.269 The likelihood of success, however, is low. In the
2013 proxy season, human rights issues constituted eight percent of
the ESG proposals filed, compared with thirty-three percent for
political spending (the largest category), and none passed.270 Perhaps
so few passed because, according to one study, only fifteen percent of
shareholders report reading a whole prospectus-notwithstanding, or
perhaps because of, all of the required disclosure data.2 7 '
B. Divestment
Some large socially responsible investors ("SRIs") choose to
make public statements when they divest, though these divestment
statements rarely have the kind of global impact sufficient to change
industry behavior. However, the Norwegian Government Pension
Fund (the "Fund"), with over $828 billion under management, is the
largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, and provides a model for
269. Id. See generally UN WORKING GROUP ON Bus. & HUMAN RIGHTS,
STATEMENT CONCERNING SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS REQUIRING COMPANIES TO
PERFORM HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE (May 13, 2013), http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/13_05_13_wgstatement
shareholderresolutions-and hrduediligence.pdf. Caterpillar objected to the
shareholder proposal, arguing that it was duplicative of material that it already
planned to disclose in its proxy and filed a no-action letter with the SEC. The SEC
indicated that it would not take action on the matter if the proposal was excluded
from the proxy. See Caterpillar Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [Incoming Letter Jan.
30, 2013] (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8/2013/afscme032513-14a8.pdf. Halliburton and McDonald's urged their
shareholders to vote against the proposal in their 2013 proxy statements. See
HALLIBURTON, 2013 Proxy Statement 70-72 (2013), http://ir.halliburton.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=67605&p=irol-reportsAnnual (follow "ANNUAL REPORT AND
PROXY," "2013 PROXY STATEMENT," hyperlink); see also MCDONALD'S CORP. 2013
PROXY STATEMENT 48-52 (2013), http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/content/dam/
AboutMcDonalds/Investors/Investor%202013/2013%20McDonalds%20Proxy%20St
atement%20-%20LQ.pdf; ProxyMonitor ScoreCard 2014, PROXY MONITOR,
http://www.proxymonitor.org/ScoreCard20l4.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
270. MARCY MURNINGHAN, REDEFINING MATERIALITY II: WHY IT
MATTERS, WHO'S INVOLVED, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR CORPORATE
LEADERS AND BOARD 7 (2013), http://accountability.org/images/content/6/8/686/
aa.materiality-report-aug20l3%20final.pdf.
271. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 68 ("only 15 percent of
shareholders report reading the whole prospectus (a report we doubt because they
are hideously hard)").
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other institutional investors.272 The Fund was originally established
to avoid fluctuations from oil sector activity by investing abroad, but
it also has a mandate to restrict investment of parts of the Fund in
companies that adversely impact the environment.27 3 More important
for the purposes of this Article, according to its ethical guidelines, the
Norwegian pension fund cannot invest in companies that produce
tobacco or that directly or indirectly contribute to killing, torture,
deprivation of freedom, or other violations of human rights in conflict
situations or wars. 274 These prohibitions stemmed from
recommendations from a 2002 government appointed committee.275
The resulting "Graver Report" examined a number of ethical
principles, and specifically considered the "main normative
characteristics that are consistent over time . . . [and distinguished]
between the obligation to influence, to avoid complicity and to
exercise retribution or punish." 27 6
In 2004, the Norwegian Council on Ethics (the Council) was
established to independently evaluate whether the Fund's
investments were in line with the Guidelines. 27 7 The quote below
exemplifies the Fund's philosophy:
One group of ethical theories asserts that we should
primarily be concerned with the consequences of the
choices we make. These theories are in other words
forward-looking, focusing on the consequences of an
action. The choice that is ethically correct influences
the world in the best possible way, i.e. has the most
272. Norway Government Pension Fund Global Excludes Three Companies for
Ethical Reasons, THE NORDIC PAGE NORWAY (Jan. 30, 2014), http://tnp.no/
norway/economy/4279-norway-government-pension-fund-global-excludes-three-
companies-for-ethical-reasons.
273. Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment From
Multinational Corporations for Human Rights Violations-The Case of Norway's
Sovereign Wealth Fund, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 577, 583 (2008).
274. Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion from the Government
Pension Fund's Global, GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY (Apr. 9, 2014),
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/the-government-pension-
fund/responsible-investments/guidelines-for-observation-and-exclusion/id594254/.
275. The Graver Committee and Ethical Guidelines, GOVERNMENT OF
NORWAY (May, 31, 2013), https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/the-
government-pension-fund/responsible-investments/The-Graver-Committee---
documents/the-graver-committee-and-ethical-guideli/id434926/.
276. The Report from the Graver Committee, supra note 59.
277. The Council on Ethics, GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY (June 26, 2013),
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/the-government-pension-fund/
responsible-investments/the-council-on-ethics-for-the-government/id447010/.
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favourable consequences .... Another group of ethical
theories focuses on avoiding breaching obligations by
avoiding doing evil and fulfilling obligations by doing
good. Whether the results are good or evil, and
whether the cost of doing good is high, are in principle
of no significance. This is often known as
deontological ethics.
In relation to the Petroleum Fund, these two
approaches will primarily influence choice in that
deontological ethics will dictate that certain
investments must be avoided under any
circumstances, while teleological ethics will lead to
the avoidance of investments that have less
favourable consequences and the promotion of
investments that have more favourable consequences
.... The issue of investments that should be avoided
may be assessed on the basis of both deontological and
teleological ethics.278
Using this framework, an independent council makes
recommendations to the Minister of Finance regarding which
companies to divest from, and which to exclude from investment in
the first place. 279 From 2011-14, the Fund divested from 114
companies due to environmental and climate change concerns. 2 80 It
has also divested because of human rights concerns. In 2006, the
Fund divested its $400 million position (over fourteen million shares
in the United States and Mexico operations) in Wal-Mart.281 In fact,
Wal-Mart constitutes two of the three companies excluded from
278. The Report From the Graver Committee, supra note 59.
279. Company Exclusions, GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/
responsible-investments/companies-excluded-from-the-investment-u.html?id=
447122.
280. Id.; see also Work on Responsible Investment Strengthened, Norges Bank
(Feb. 5, 2015) (quoting the CEO of Norges Bank Investment Management as
stating that the Fund had divested from 114 companies so far).
281. See Gwladys Fouche & Joachim Dagenborg, Norway's $800 Bln Fund
Should Lose Independent Ethics Panel-Report, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/11/norway-sovereignwealthfund-ethics-
idUSL5NOIT23S20131111; Lisa Shapiro, Walmart Blacklisted by Major Pension
Fund Over Poor Labor Practices, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/05/walmart-blacklist-abp-pension-
fund_n_1186384.html; Andrew Ang, The Norwegian Government Pension Fund:
The Divestiture of Wal-Mart Stores Inc., COLUMBIA CASEWORKS,
https://www8.gsb.columbia.edulcaseworks/node/256 (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
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investments by the Fund due to a "series of systematic" human rights
violations.2 82 Pension funds in Sweden and the Netherlands followed
the Fund's lead after determining that Wal-Mart had not done
enough to change its labor practices.2 83 In a similar decision, the city
of Portland, Oregon began the process of divesting itself of all interest
in Wal-Mart in 2014.284 City Commissioner Steve Novick cited the
company's labor, wage, and hour practices, as well as a recent bribery
scandal,28 5 as significant factors in the decision.286
Colleges and universities represent another powerful group of
investors. A number of NGOs and student groups have attempted to
leverage the buying power of these institutions to spur companies to
do more regarding conflict minerals. 28 7 However, this has achieved
limited success.288
282. Company Exclusions, supra note 279.
283. Clare O'Connor, How Angry Walmart Workers Helped Convince Foreign
Investors to Dump Shares, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.forbes.comi/sites/
clareoconnor/2013/10/07/how-angry-walmart-workers-helped-convince-foreign-
investors-to-dump-shares/.
284. Elizabeth A. Harris, Portland, Ore., Sheds Its Walmart Bonds, N.Y.
TIMES (May 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/business/portland-ore-
will-no-longer-invest-in-walmart.html?_r=0.
285. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After
Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/
22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all;
Sam Gustin, How Big a Deal Is Walmart's Mexico Bribery Scandal?, TIME
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/04/23/how-big-a-deal-is-wal-marts-
mexico-bribery-scandal/.
286. Harris, supra note 284. On February 17, 2015, Wal-Mart announced a
significant wage increase for workers as well as changes to its health insurance
programs. Steven Greenhouse, Workers and Critics Greet Walmart Pay Raise But
Say Much Remains to Be Done, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/23/workers-activists-walmart-pay-raise.
It remains to be seen whether those funds that have divested will reinvest based
upon these changes.
287. Conflict-Free Campus Initiative, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO,
http://raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-free-campus-initiative (last visited
Mar. 6, 2014).
288. Michael Posner, Co-Director of the NYU Stern Center for Bus. & Human
Rights, Universities Not Making Enough Progress to Protect Human Rights
In Supply Chain, Spending or Investments, Speech at U. Mich. (Oct. 10, 2014),
in NYU Stern Center for Bus. & Human Rights, Oct. 10 2014,
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/about/departments-centers-initiatives/
centers-of-research/business-human-rights/activities/universities-not-making-
enough-progress-protect-human-rights-supply-chain-spending-or.
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In early 2015, a group of sixty European investors with over
$4 trillion in assets under management called on companies to uphold
labor rights, and they endorsed the UNGP Reporting Framework for
firms to assess their human rights impacts.289 In the call to action,
the investors stated that "meaningful disclosure of human rights
performance can play a significant role in reducing a company's
human rights risks ... contributing to a company's competitive
advantage, and strengthening its long-term financial stability." 290
Notably, the investors used the term "meaningful disclosures." It is
too early to tell whether this call to action will have a substantial and
sustained impact on corporate behavior.
C. An Ethical Framework for Divestment
Norway and the other governments that have made ethical
purchasing and divestment decisions can influence others to do the
same. I recommend the following guidelines to facilitate that decision-
making process, based upon disclosures or other information that the
investor has obtained about a company. Although I generally do not
believe that disclosures are enough, stakeholders can consider these
inquiries even with the incomplete disclosures that exist today. The
guidelines that I recommend represent a way to work within the
disclosure framework that exists to make it as effective as possible.
More importantly, stakeholders can ask their own questions of
companies to ascertain the information that is most relevant to their
decision-making process. These proposed guidelines are particularly
pertinent when a firm is contemplating taking new action, or entering
a market in an area with known human rights issues.
Because I believe that many companies may speak like
Kantians in their CSR materials but act like utilitarians in practice,
we need a set of questions that provides the flexibility to address each
type of firm under a variety of circumstances. The following questions
289. See UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework Investor Statement,
UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES REPORTING FRAMEWORK (July 31, 2015),
http://www.ungpreporting.org/early-adopters/investor-statement; $4 Trillion
Investor Coalition Backs New Human Rights Reporting Tool, BOSTON COMMON
ASSET MANAGEMENT (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.bostoncommonasset.com/news/
UNGP.php.
290. $4T Investor Group Backs UN Human Rights Initiative, ASSET
INTERNATIONAL-CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER (Feb. 25, 2015), http://ai-
cio.com/channel/NEWS1IAKERS/$4TInvestorGroupBacksUNHumanRights
Initiative.html.
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have been adapted from Laczniak and Murphy, 291 and are as
appropriate for human rights as they are for ethical marketing.
Investors (and possibly conscious consumers) can make more critical
assessments of disclosures, and/or make more reasoned choices about
the firms they support after considering these baseline questions.
1) Does the contemplated action violate the law? (The
legal test)
This is the simplest and most straightforward factor.
Regardless of whether the home or host country enforces laws
affecting human rights, firms are expected to comply with the law.2 92
Furthermore, for those firms that must comply with the requisite
disclosures, failure to comply could lead to legal issues or, more
importantly, to calls for additional, stricter legislation. This guideline
reiterates what the UN indicated about business and social contracts
in 1999. "' Investors who fail in shareholder proposals can, and
should, lobby legislators to enact regulations with more teeth if the
disclosure regime does not provide a direct benefit to those affected by
human rights issues. Investors should also focus on firm compliance
with the law, not home or host country enforcement of the law. Most
importantly, they should consider whether firms comply with both
the spirit and the letter of the law.
2) Is the action contrary to widely accepted moral
obligations? (The duties test)
Firms and stakeholders may have differing views of their
"duties" and moral obligations. These could include Kantian duties,
"duties" or "responsibilities" under the UNGPs, and/or obligations
under various industry or other voluntary initiatives. Although I
think this factor is helpful, it should be further refined, and must
take into account the concept of "moral free space" discussed in Part
291. See N. Craig Smith, Social Marketing and Social Contracts: Applying
Integrative Social Contracts Theory to Ethical Issues in Social Marketing (London
Business School Centre for Marketing Working Paper No. 00-702 Oct. 2000),
http://facultyresearch.london.edu/does/00-702.pdf. The article cites the seminal
piece by Laczniak and Murphy. See GENE R. LACZNIAK & PATRICK E. MURPHY,
ETHICAL MARKETING DECISIONS: THE HIGHER ROAD (Allyn & Bacon 1993).
Laczniak and Murphy also identify the issue of sufficient disclosure as an ethical
issue.
292. See OECD, supra note 131.
293. See UN Conference on Trade & Development, supra note 50.
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II, so that cultural norms that do not violate basic human rights are
respected. However, TNCs cannot use respect for local customs as an
excuse to violate baseline human rights. Some firms that tout their
human rights credentials may attempt to argue that they are
complying with cultural norms in order to excuse otherwise
unacceptable behavior. For example, some firms may not follow
standard safety precautions because they are not legally required to
do so by the host country. This duties test also ensures compliance
with the UNGP requirement that corporations respect human rights,
regardless of local law.294 This test requires a careful comparison
between the words in a CSR or disclosure report and a firm's actions.
3) Does the proposed action violate any special
obligations that stem from the type of organization?
(The special obligations test)
Certain stakeholders could argue that companies that provide
food, security, data, and medical services, for example, should have
special obligations to the communities in which they operate. Others
might argue that those in the extractive industry have heightened
duties, because they often deal with oppressive regimes so that they
can have access to timber, water, land, and other minerals, even if
indigenous peoples also claim rights to those resources. It is possible
that some TNCs should be held to a higher standard, but regardless
of the level of special obligation, all firms should be able to answer
questions about their complicity, using the UN definitions described
in Part II. If disclosures do not require this information, then
stakeholders should ask questions to obtain this information, and use
the complicity guidelines to hold firms accountable.
4) Is the intent of the contemplated action harmful?
(The motives test)
A number of the most egregious allegations against TNCs fall
into this category. For example, residents of Papua, New Guinea sued
Rio Tinto in 2000 under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging, among other
things, that Rio Tinto was complicit in war crimes and crimes against
humanity after the government quelled a violent uprising and fought
a secessionist civil war-a war that was caused in part by the firm's
alleged environmental crimes and racially discriminatory labor
294. Laczniak & Murphy, supra note 291; OECD, supra note 131, at 32.
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practices. 295 The suit, brought on behalf of 10,000 people, claimed that
the firm used its influence with the Papua New Guinea government
to put down the rebellion, and that the armed forces eventually killed
15,000 citizens-almost ten percent of the population-through acts
which included bombings and burning villages. 296 The suit also
alleged that the government, acting for Rio Tinto, established a
blockade of the island so that residents could not receive vital
supplies.297 According to the Ninth Circuit, "the complaint allege[d]
purposeful conduct undertaken by Rio Tinto with the intent to assist
in the commission of violence, injury, and death, to the degree
necessary to keep its mines open."298 After the Kiobel decision, which
limited jurisdiction under the ATS, the Rio Tinto plaintiffs had no
redress in U.S. courts.299 Although this test will not apply to most
TNCs, it certainly will apply to some, and stakeholders do not need
firm disclosures to assess this factor. News reports and court filings
will likely provide the relevant information.
5) Is it likely that any major harms to people or
organizations will result from the contemplated
action? (The consequences test)
This factor is perhaps the most subjective because of the
differing definitions of "harmful." Some examples illustrate the
potential conflict of interest between stakeholders. An NGO may
believe that corporate sponsors of mega-events, such as the World
Cup or the Olympics, have a responsibility to speak out against the
host country's actions, or to boycott the events. In their view, failure
to do so could cause harm to the host country's residents. Consumers
and fans, on the other hand, may believe that the sponsor's
involvement in buying commercials and plastering logos on stadiums
is attenuated from the host country's human rights abuses, and that
pulling out or boycotting would harm local communities and athletes.
Similarly, a corporation may believe that it is protecting pregnant
women by banning them from working around certain chemicals,
295. David Pallister, Islanders Sue in US over Impact of Rio Tinto Mine,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2000), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/08/
davidpallister.riotinto.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 767 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated,
133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
299. Id.
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even though the host country's laws do not prohibit such employment.
The workers, on the other hand, may prefer to take the risk so that
they can earn money for their families. Is it more harmful for the firm
to ban such employees, or to retain them? The consequences test also
requires a value judgment as to the level of harm that is acceptable,
because the question asks only about "major" harm. Likewise, the
UNGPs specifically contemplate a weighing of consequences and
harms by requiring firms to conduct due diligence in their supply
chains for their human rights impacts. "o Although it is highly
subjective, some investors may find this consequences factor useful.
Investors with a utilitarian mindset, for example, may find the test
particularly satisfying. Ultimately, investors should make the
decisions that best comport with their values. "Ethical" consumers
may need to consider whether their attendance at an event, or their
purchase of a sponsor's goods, makes them "complicit" in human
rights abuses. Socially responsible investors have, in the past, passed
submitted shareholder proposals in the United States, but perhaps
they can play a bigger role if this factor resonates with their
principles.
6) Is there a satisfactory alternative action that
produces equal or greater benefits to the parties
affected than the proposed action? (The utilitarian
test)
This question would provide stakeholders with the
opportunity to work with the firm to determine alternatives prior to
harmful actions being taken, provided that the firm was actively
engaged with the appropriate groups. Again, though, the word
"satisfactory" can lead to difficulty. An NGO may expect a TNC to
pull out of a country, or to go above and beyond what the host
country's law requires, in order to meet the NGO's standards. On the
other hand, some investors or even board members may argue that
providing donations to appropriate charities, or staying in the country
to push for legislative change, are better alternatives. Nonetheless,
stakeholders can utilize this factor whether they rely on existing
disclosures, or (preferably) they ask specific questions that can assist
in their assessment of the firm.
300. See Guiding Principles, supra note 15, 1 17.
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7) Does the contemplated action infringe upon human
rights? (The rights test)
This test should be relatively easy to apply, given the amount
of guidance that firms and stakeholders have from the sources,
including disclosures, described above. Firms that are more involved
with the State or with human rights offenders should have more of a
positive duty to protect human rights, rather than a negative duty to
simply do no harm.
8) Does the proposed action leave another person or
group less well off? Is the person or group already a
member of a relatively underprivileged class? (The
justice test)
Like the duties test, this seemingly straightforward test could
have differing answers, depending on one's perspective and priorities.
In some instances, a project may provide jobs to a large segment of
the community, but may also have significant environmental or
human rights impacts, especially for indigenous peoples.
Stakeholders assessing disclosures will again have to make a
judgment call in line with their stated principles.
If current disclosures do not aid in these inquiries,
stakeholders should ask the targeted questions that do. The problem,
however, will be overcoming the collective action issues that currently
disincentivize this sort of engagement. Although I propose this ethical
framework in the section on investors, consumers and board members
could adopt one or more parts of the test as well in evaluating
disclosures and firm behavior overall. In fact, I would recommend
that board members ask these questions in a balancing test that best
fits their business needs and corporate culture before agreeing to sign
on to any voluntary initiatives, making disclosures, or engaging in
new business in an area with known human rights issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some consumers and investors will patronize and invest in
firms regardless of their human rights records. In fact, for some
customers and shareholders, a firm's refusal to allow unions or use of
underage labor keeps costs down, and could provide a company with a
competitive advantage. For them, operating in a weak or failed State
is not a barrier, but a benefit, because of under-enforced or
nonexistent laws. Others may have an interest in human rights
impacts, but do not know how to make informed decisions based on
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the numerous, confusing, and often incomplete disclosures they
receive.
Adding or tweaking disclosures is not the answer. Assuming
stakeholders even see or read the disclosures, one-size-fits-all
disclosure regimes do not provide adequate information. Disclosures
are either too much, too little, or not relevant to the kinds of decisions
that stakeholders will make in the human rights context. It is also
possible that the weakness of disclosure reflects on the social contract
itself. Perhaps consumer and investor apathy suggest that ethical
business practices are not an essential part of business' social
contract. Market participants may not see themselves as defining or
enforcing the social contract between business and society.
Regardless of the reason for the failure of disclosures, I argue
that legislators should move away from disclosures, rather than
trying to fix them; instead, they should enact human rights
legislation that imposes meaningful penalties on companies that
negatively impact human rights, such as financial fines, criminal
prosecution when warranted, debarment from government contracts,
and when appropriate, an embargo against the host country so that
companies cannot do business with regimes with oppressive human
rights records. Countries that insist on disclosure should also provide
significant incentives, such as procurement preferences, for
complying with the UNGPs and otherwise positively impacting
human rights."o1 More importantly, if countries use disclosure, they
must do more. Legislators must not only penalize failure to comply
with the procedural hurdles of disclosure, but most also require
disclosure of due diligence and human rights impacts; prohibit
activities that negatively impact human rights; and punish firms for
substantive violations. Finally, I propose an eight-factor test to
provide guidance on using current disclosures or stakeholder-specific
inquiries. The test, while not perfect, is a first step to a broader and
more robust inquiry about corporate accountability that I will develop
in a future Article. In the interim, the questions can provide a basic
framework by which others can judge firms and, indeed, firms can
judge themselves. Although it may not provide a remedy for breaches
of the social contract, it may provide another way to ascertain
whether the firm has lived up to its legal and non-legal obligations.
301. I discuss this in detail in Narine, supra note 23.
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